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Abstract 
 
The Financial Transaction Tax, or FTT, was supposed to alleviate the financial burden of the Member States, curb 
out-of-control high-frequency trading and force the wealthy bankers to take responsibility in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis. Instead, the tax was seen in many ways an infringement of national sovereignty and a sign of 
creeping federalisation; taking the powers of the European Union to areas outside its competencies and impeding 
heavily on the national financial markets.  
 
This thesis is interested in the Parliamentary discourse around the FTT and how the controversial topic was 
presented, contested and justified by the Members of the Parliament, the MEPs. What is the impact of the tension 
between national and supranational decision-making levels, political ideology and personal utility-maximising on 
the voting decisions of the representatives? Furthermore, attention should be paid not only in how the MEPs voted 
in the plenary but also how they framed the issue in the plenary speeches. The representatives retain a strong 
incentive to appeal to their constituencies to maintain voter satisfaction and ultimately, to become re-elected. 
 
The theoretical framework is drawn from research on European integration, politicisation, the political groups in 
the European Parliament and theories of rational choice institutionalism. The research is conducted as a case study 
with mixed methods: through quantitative analysis of the MEPs’ voting decisions to enlighten the national and 
supranational tensions and qualitative analysis of the MEPs’ plenary debate before and after the vote.  
 
The results confirm largely the assumptions rising from the theoretical literature: the voting results reveal the 
strong pressures arising from conflicting national interests against the integration-advancing proposal. 
Representatives from the FTT-opposing Member States are clearly restricted in their actions, whereas MEPs from 
supporting Member States are almost unison in their support across group borders. If the Member State does not 
have a strong opinion on the FTT, most Members vote according to group instructions.  
 
The analysis from the debate proves that no single definition of the FTT exists - instead the justifications and 
notions of the tax range from global solidarity to staunch defenders of national sovereignty. The themes arising 
from the plenary discourses can be divided under three politicisation frames: a normative one emphasising the role 
of the banking sector as the root of the financial crisis with suffering citizens, a functional frame with ‘rational’ 
economic arguments and an authoritarian frame over the power struggle between national and supranational level 
decision-making. In general, MEPs from the large groups adhere more to an economic normalisation narrative of 
regulated capitalism vs. neoliberalism, whereas the smaller political groups in the ends of the political spectrum are 
more ideologically orientated in their speeches. 
 
The merits of the thesis lie in depicting the different forms of narratives the MEPs use regarding their background 
while proving the enduring influence of national pressures in supranational decision-making. 
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Euroopan unionin finanssitransaktioveron (FTT) tarkoituksena oli helpottaa jäsenmaiden taloudellista taakkaa, 
rajoittaa huippunopeaa tietokoneistettua pörssikauppaa sekä pakottaa pankkiirit kantamaan vastuunsa 
finanssikriisin jälkimainingeissa. Vero voitiin kuitenkin nähdä myös kansallista itsemääräämisoikeutta rikkovana 
sekä merkkinä hiipivästä liittovaltiokehityksestä – vieden unionin sen toimivallan ulkopuolelle samalla 
vahingoittaen kansallisia rahoitusmarkkinoita. 
 
Tutkimus keskittyy tarkastelemaan Euroopan parlamentin jäsenten keskustelua verosta ja miten ristiriitainen aloite 
esitettiin, kiistettiin ja oikeutettiin heidän toimestaan. Työn tarkoituksena on myös selvittää miten kansallisen ja 
ylikansallisen päätöksenteon tasojen välinen jännite, poliittiset ideologiat sekä yksilötason hyödyn maksimoiminen 
vaikuttavat poliitikkojen äänestyspäätöksiin. Huomiota tulee kiinnittää äänestystulosten lisäksi myös 
täysistuntokeskusteluihin. Poliitikoilla on vahva kannustin vedota äänestäjiinsä pitääkseen heidät tyytyväisenä ja 
tullakseen uudelleenvalituksi. 
 
Teoreettinen viitekehys pohjautuu tutkimukseen Euroopan integraatiosta, politisaatiosta, Euroopan parlamentin 
poliittisista ryhmistä sekä rationaalisen valinnan institutionalismiin. Tutkimus on suoritettu tapaustutkimuksena 
yhdistäen kansallisen ja ylikansallisen päätöksenteon tasojen jännitettä kuvaavan kvantitatiivisten äänestystulosten 
tarkastelun kvalitatiiviseen täysistuntopuheiden analyysiin. 
 
Tulokset pääsääntöisesti vahvistavat teoriapohjasta nousevat oletukset: äänestystulokset osoittavat kansallisen 
paineen olevan voimakas jäsenmaan vastustaessa integraatiota edistävää aloitetta. Näistä jäsenmaista kotoisin 
olevien päättäjien valinnat ovat selvästi rajoitetumpia, kun taas heidän kollegansa aloitetta kannattavista 
jäsenmaista tukevat veroa lähes yksimielisesti poliittisista ryhmistä huolimatta. Mikäli jäsenmaalla ei ole 
voimakasta kantaa veroa kohtaan, suurin osa edustajista äänestää ryhmiensä ohjeiden mukaisesti.  
 
Täysistuntokeskustelun analyysi osoittaa, ettei finanssitransaktioverolle löydy yhtä määritelmää – oikeutukset 
kulkevat globaalista solidaarisuudesta järkkymättömään kansallisen suvereniteetin puolustukseen. Keskustelusta 
nousevat teemat voidaan jakaa kolmen politisaatiokehyksen alle: normatiivinen kehys korostaa pankkisektorin 
roolia syypäänä finanssikriisin, jonka uhreiksi tavalliset kansalaiset ovat joutuneet; funktionaalinen kehys kattaa 
‘rationaalisia’ taloudellisia argumentteja ja autoritaarinen kehys käsittää valtataistelun kansallisen ja ylikansallisen 
tasojen päätöksenteon välillä. Yleisesti voidaan sanoa suurten poliittisten ryhmien edustajien käyttävän enemmän 
taloudelliseen normalisaatioon perustuvia puheenvuoroja säännellyn markkinatalouden vs. uusliberalismin teorian 
hengessä, kun taas pienten ryhmien edustajat ovat ideologisesti värittyneempiä puheissaan. 
 
Tutkimuksen ansioina voidaan nähdä poliittisten päätöstentekijöiden taustan havainnollistaminen heidän 
käyttämässään kielessään sekä kansallisen tason vaikutuksen osoittamisen ylikansallisessa päätöksenteossa. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The case of the Financial Transaction Tax, or FTT, in the European Union has been one of 
high ambitions and low outcomes. The proposed tax was supposed to alleviate the financial 
burden of the Member States, curb out-of-control high-frequency trading and force the 
wealthy bankers to take responsibility in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Even though 
taxation is at the core of national policy tools, the detailed discussion of taxes levied on 
specific sectors is usually at the lowest point of interest to anyone outside a small technical 
aficionado. However, the seemingly innocent tax was seen in many ways an infringement of 
national sovereignty and a sign of creeping federalisation; taking the powers of the European 
Union to areas outside EU competencies and impeding heavily on the national financial 
markets. The tax was seen as a move towards a federal-style budget of the European Union 
with own resources to gather and spend – perhaps even at the cost of the Member States’ 
economies. The Commission proposed a Council directive on the FTT and the European 
Parliament was involved in the decision-making through the consultation procedure. Even 
though it was soon apparent that the tax would not proceed in the proposed EU-wide form, 
the Parliament handled the issue according to the legislative procedure, including a plenary 
session and vote. 
This thesis is interested in the Parliamentary discourse around the FTT and how the 
controversial topic was presented, contested and justified by the Members of the Parliament, 
the MEPs. The impact of national pressure and the juxtaposition between national and 
supranational levels is also of interest. The study sees the FTT as a question of European 
integration: furthering EU influence and operation into areas previously untouched. The rise 
of Euroscepticism has influenced political contestation and increased political salience 
around European integration. Moreover, the political field from left to right is not unanimous 
in their opinion towards financial regulation – the left prefers more whereas the right would 
see the markets unhampered by regulation. In addition to the tax being contested as an issue 
of European integration or ideology, the field of economics is also divided on the efficiency 
and impacts of the tax. The politicians have a plethora of arguments and scientific 
justifications to choose from, no matter what their stance on the tax is.  
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The reason why politicians would embark on the controversial issue lies in gaining visibility 
and the electorate’s attention. However, as the major political groups in the European 
Parliament strive to advance European integration; their MEPs from countries with a 
contradicting view or a major Eurosceptic tinge have more challenges in framing the issue to 
their electorates than those colleagues from Europhile Member States. A strategic politician 
will try to find a balance between possible national and European level tensions as well as 
please his or her electorates. This creates an interesting research problem into the nature of 
the narratives within supranational decision-making on contested European issues which has 
largely been left unresearched thus far. 
Based on this foundation, the thesis assumes that even though the MEPs by and large adhere 
to their political group recommendations when voting on the proposal, their ideological 
background and national pressures are not entirely forgotten. Thus, attention should be paid 
not only in how the MEPs voted in the plenary but also how they framed the issue in the 
plenary speeches targeted to the press and electorates. The representatives might follow the 
voting instructions of their political groups, but they still retain a strong incentive to appeal to 
their constituencies to maintain voter satisfaction and ultimately, to become re-elected.  
The research questions are thus formulated as follows: 
How is the financial transaction tax presented by the Members of the European Parliament?  
How do the background factors of the MEP’s political group, ideology and national opinions 
on the financial transaction tax affect their voting decisions and issue framing?  
In order to answer these questions comprehensively, the theoretical framework is divided into 
four subchapters covering European integration, politicisation, the political groups in the 
European Parliament and theories of rational choice institutionalism as all of these tenets are 
seen to influence the decision-making of the MEPs. European integration has advanced 
strongly as a project for the economy and the topic is presented through research on national 
and political parties’ attitudes towards European integration. Theories of politicisation are 
included to provide a framework for researching political contestation and issue politicisation 
– how do politicians take advantage of publicly salient issues and create political contestation 
to suit their goals and what is the role of politicisation for European integration? As the 
political groups offer the supranational environment for political competition within the 
European institutions, the groups are presented with a caption into their operation, cohesion 
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and alliance building. Lastly, the theoretical framework of rational choice institutionalism is 
applied to reach the micro-level action, the politicians themselves. According to rational 
choice institutionalism, politicians are rational utility-maximisers and in this study, utility is 
translated into a target of ensuring re-election as well as adhering to an internal logic of 
appropriateness. 
The research is conducted as a case study with mixed methods: through quantitative analysis 
of the MEPs’ voting decisions to enlighten the national and supranational tensions and 
through qualitative analysis of the MEPs’ plenary debate before and after the vote. The 
results confirm largely the assumptions rising from the theoretical literature: Like the title of 
the thesis describes, no single definition of the FTT exists - instead the justifications and 
notions of the tax range from global solidarity to staunch defenders of national sovereignty. 
The themes arising from the plenary discourses can be divided under three politicisation 
frames: a normative one emphasising the role of the banking sector as the root of the financial 
crisis and with suffering citizens, a functional frame with ‘rational’ economic arguments and 
an authoritarian frame over the power struggle between national and supranational level 
decision-making. In general, MEPs from the large groups adhere more to an economic 
normalisation narrative of regulated capitalism vs. neoliberalism, whereas the smaller 
political groups in the ends of the political spectrum are more ideologically orientated in their 
speeches. The analysis of the voting results reveals the strong pressures arising from 
conflicting national interests against the integration-advancing proposal. Representatives 
from FTT-opposing Member States are clearly restricted in their actions, whereas MEPs from 
supporting Member States are almost unison in their support across group borders. If the 
Member State does not have a strong opinion on the FTT, most Members vote according to 
group instructions. 
In short, the representatives face pressure from the national and supranational levels of 
politics and in delicate questions such as the financial transaction tax, the actions of the MEPs 
are restricted and it comes to the politicians themselves to strategically choose the optimal 
method of conduct for the situation – and then possibly justify it to clarify their choices to 
their electorate. The merits of the thesis lie in depicting the different forms of narratives the 
MEPs use regarding their background while proving the enduring influence of national 
pressures in supranational decision-making. 
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2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
As presented in the introduction, the actions of the Members or the European Parliament can 
be founded on many influential factors: the interplay between advancing European 
integration and national sovereignty, political ideology and identity as well as personal 
estimates of utility in each course of action. Once the politician has decided on a specific 
voting strategy, the justifications for those actions might be beneficial to voice out in order to 
maintain voter satisfaction.  
To form a solid foundation for the analysis, the theoretical chapter addresses the elements and 
pressures these factors bring into the analysis through literature from various researchers on 
European integration, national influence in European-level politics, politicisation, political 
groups and new institutionalism. The theoretical framework is also summarised at the end of 
the chapter to provide a route map for the actual analysis. 
 
2.1 EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
2.1.1 European integration as a project for the economy 
Economic justifications are behind the building of the European Community and later, the 
European Union. What started as a customs union eventually grew through a common 
legislative framework for a single market to a political Union, surpassing even the powers of 
national legislators in some policy areas. A majority of the Member States have even agreed 
to pool in their monetary policy creating a common currency, the Euro. One could say that in 
the European Union the economy comes first and countries have been willing to ebb away 
their national sovereignty over financial benefits.  
Goetz and Hix give one of the best definitions for integration that deserves quoting in length 
as they describe European integration as  
“two inter-related processes: the delegation of policy competences to the 
supranational level to achieve particular policy outcomes; and the 
establishment of a new set of political institutions, with executive, legislative 
and judicial powers” (2001, 3). 
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The case of the Financial Transaction Tax, or the FTT, directly impacts two areas of the 
economy: financial markets and taxation. Placing a tax on stocks, derivatives and other 
financial instruments can be seen to forward European integration both in scope and depth. 
And indeed, advancing the single market produces a fundamental justification for the 
Commission when it presents the tax. According to the Commission (2011b), the diverse 
field of financial transaction taxes in ten different Member States should be harmonised via a 
single framework and minimum levels of taxation to enhance coordination and effectiveness 
within the Union. The Commission suggests even of further aspirations - with the Europeans 
leading the way, the FTT could be eventually promoted across the G20 countries (ibid.). 
Despite a neoliberal political momentum with a deregulation trend in the 1980s, European 
regulation of the financial markets begun during the decade. European capital markets were 
not very integrated before the 1986 Single European Act and especially the 1988 directive 
eradicating capital movement restrictions among EU-citizens launched the European 
legislation over financial markets (Baldwin & Wyplosz 2012, 499). Following neo-liberal 
political and monetarist economic trends, liberalised capital movements were seen as crucial 
to enhance capital allocation efficiency and diversification (ibid.). Interestingly enough, the 
justifications that helped to harmonise financial markets almost thirty years ago were seen as 
negative traits in the case of the FTT: instead of removing barriers and allowing the free flow 
of capital movements, it was seen necessary to reduce the amount of trade and hinder the 
movement of capital. 
Whereas before the capital markets were seen in a positive light, the financial crisis in the late 
2000s changed the tone of the politicians. This is visible in the Commission’s justifications, 
where an important aspect of the FTT’s justification is the ‘fairness’ factor: the banks are not 
merely forced to take responsibility – they are also portrayed as guilty. The Commission 
presents the FTT as a fair solution to the financial crisis, since the financial sector has 
brought insecurity to the world markets and the nation states now bear the burden of 
rectifying the situation. An additional interesting aspect is the reasoning behind the ‘under-
taxed’ financial sector – a claim that would be hard to make concerning private persons or 
businesses. (European Commission 2011a) 
Taxation is a policy field generally kept tightly within the Member State’s competencies as 
taxation directly touches the lives of most citizens and businesses (Baldwin & Wyplosz 2012, 
51). National tax policy is the outcome of hard-fought political compromise between broad 
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groups of fully engaged and informed citizens, firms and labour unions (ibid.). Due to this, 
EU leaders have found it problematic to harmonise taxation and this difficulty is clear in the 
wording of the EU treaties: tax duties can be harmonised in the interest of the common 
market and the Commission needs to submit the proposals to the Council, accepting them 
through unanimity (ibid.). Hence the European Union has been given a supporting role in the 
form of indirect taxation when it has been seen to influence the free flow of goods, capital 
and services - the common system of a value-added tax as an example of the EU’s 
competencies (European Commission 2014b).  
Even though taxation is in principle outside EU legislation the Union has meddled with it 
before, although never like with the FTT. The imposition of an EU-level transaction tax 
would mean eradicating national transaction taxes, which are a direct source of income to the 
Member States. The Commission also tried to persuade the Member States into accepting the 
tax by presenting the gathering of own resources as a substitute for the direct payments from 
the Member States (European Commission 2011b). The opposition from the Member States 
can be founded on many arguments of impeding on the national economic and financial 
sovereignty, be it possibly damaging the free flow of financial markets or substituting 
national taxes with a European alternative. 
 
2.1.2 The Financial Transaction Tax 
The Financial Transaction Tax, also known as the Tobin tax, has one of its most known roots 
in the proposed 0,1 % tax levy on all foreign exchange transactions (Tobin 1978). According 
to the American economist James Tobin, the tax discourages short-term speculative trade 
(1978, 155) and thus decreases market volatility, i.e. price variation. According to many 
economists, the FTT or any similar tax on market transactions can stabilise markets by 
hindering excess short-term speculative trade by raising the costs of market transactions and 
thus bringing speculators’ profits down (e.g. Cortez & Vogel 2011, 18; Mannaro et al. 2008, 
445; Pollin 2012, 97; Subrahmanyam 1998, 81). Medium and long-term investments are 
often thought of as the real investments on the markets and short-term transactions are 
generally believed to be speculative, bringing volatility and instability with them (Mannaro et 
al. 2008, 445).  
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But not all agree on this principle. Even though the Keynesian and post-Keynesian schools of 
economic thinkers have been all for the FTT even up to this day, the monetarists have 
strongly opposed the tax. Although the transaction tax is seen as a way for governments to 
raise revenues (e.g. Pollin 2012, 97), it is good to note that the increase of transaction prices 
will eventually lead to an increase in capital prices paid by the customers, business and 
governments (Nerudová 2011, 209). Even the nature of short-term trade is contested whether 
it is a hinder or aid for more efficient markets - for example a Commission consultation paper 
(European Commission 2010, 14) brings out a possibility that short-term trade can add 
liquidity (i.e. the ease at with a security can be transformed into cash), reduce spreads (i.e. the 
difference in asking and bidding price of a security) and ease price alignment. Financial 
markets are characterised by a strong home bias emanating from information asymmetry and 
currency risk (Baldwin & Wyplosz 2012, 509). The Eurozone has eased the latter part with 
financial markets opening up within the Euro-countries, but installing a separating tax inside 
the Euro area is bound to affect the financial markets’ integration in Europe (ibid.). The 
proposal for the FTT is in effect hindering capital market mobility, reflecting a change in 
ideology as well as policy goals. 
The possible effects of a large-scale border crossing transaction tax are hard to predict and 
many countries oppose them due to the uncertainty of the outcome. The FTT or a trading tax 
of similar nature is already in use in many countries but the actual use of financial transaction 
taxes seems to be globally on the decline (Nerudová 2011, 208; Pollin 2012, 97). Many 
countries have abolished their trading tax over the years as they have found it ineffective and 
trade hindering (Cortez & Vogel 2011, 18). The opposition to the tax is strong especially in 
the United Kingdom and Sweden, where a similar tax has been tried. Studies from the United 
Kingdom show that even though the taxes have had a negative effect on liquidity and overall 
pricing, no significant harm has come to the financial markets (Cortez & Vogel 2011, 27) - 
that might also be, because the UK tax covers only about 20% of all London Stock Exchange 
trading (Schäfer 2012, 82). Then again the Swedish domestic transaction tax of 0.5% levied 
on all domestic transactions in 1984-1991 re-allocated about 50% of the Swedish exchanges 
to the United Kingdom (Schäfer 2012, 82).  
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2.1.3 Progression of the tax 
The European Commission published a proposal in September 2011 for a common financial 
transaction tax in the European Union (European Commission 2011b). The main two goals 
for implementing a FTT in the EU are the same as anywhere: to stabilise markets by 
decreasing short-term speculative trade and to raise revenues for the Union, an estimate of 57 
billion euros a year (Cortez & Vogel 2011, 16; European Commission 2015). The tax is 
presented as a way of raising new revenue without placing an additional burden of the 
Member States (Henkow 2012, 5). According to the proposal, a tax rate of 0.1% (0.01 % on 
derivatives) is to be levied on a financial transaction if at least one party of the action is 
established in the EU; in general all financial institution parties are obliged to pay the 
transaction tax (Henkow 2012, 6, 13). The proposition concerns almost all kinds of financial 
products, excluding foreign exchange transactions, provision of credit and insurance 
transactions (Henkow 2012, 7-8), so it reaches further than the original proposal by Tobin. 
As taxation is outside EU competencies, the proposal was launched as a Council directive. 
The European Parliament was involved via the consultation procedure, which requires the 
Council to consult the Parliament for an opinion, but it is not bound by it (European 
Commission 2014a). The proposal was soon taken under processing in the European 
Parliament’s Committee for Economic and Monetary Affairs, also consulting Committees for 
Budgets, Development and the Internal Market and Customer Protection which produced 
their own opinions on the proposed directive (European Parliament 2014b). The Parliament 
voted for the resolution in the May 2012 Plenary with votes 487 for, 152 against and 46 
abstentions in order to move the proposal forward (Votewatch Europe 2014a). 
Unfortunately for the FTT, the Council of the European Union was not as excited about the 
proposal as the Parliament. Representing the Member State’s opinion, the Economic and 
Financial Affairs Council, ECOFIN, handled the issue in several meetings until in June 2012 
it came to a conclusion that a unanimous decision on the matter could not be made (European 
Council 2012). However, some Member States indicated that they wished to proceed under 
the umbrella of enhanced cooperation and asked for the Commission to draw up a new 
legislative act (European Parliament 2014). The Commission drafted a new proposal for a 
Council directive under the title of enhanced cooperation (EUR-Lex 2014) while keeping the 
contents in the spirit of the original proposal, as asked by 11 Member States such as France 
and Germany (European Commission 2014c, European Council 2014). The proposal was 
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again pushed forward in the European Parliament on July 3
rd
 2013 with a large majority of 
522 for, 141 against and 42 abstentions (Votewatch Europe 2014c). The participating 
Member States have agreed to implement the first phase of the tax on January 1
st
 2016 and 
are now in the process of negotiating the details of the proposition (European Council 2014). 
 
2.1.4 National opinions on European integration and the FTT 
The Members of the European Parliament are selected in national elections, so the political 
atmosphere and the position of their Member State on European integration and especially 
the FTT have its implications on the actions of the representatives. What has risen in 
importance for MEPs during elections is the rise of Euroscepticism and how it affects their 
own election strategies via their national parties. Some politicians gain by riding on the tide 
of rising doubts about integration and tapping into those turbulent sentiments. For others, and 
especially the MEPs from the largest political groups, the issue of Euroscepticism creates 
difficulties during election times both in regard to their own actions and viewpoints on 
integration and how to present oneself in the best possible light during growing rumbles of 
discontent.   
Even though European integration has risen in issue salience since the 1970s, the 
mobilisation of Euroscepticism has not been equal throughout the Member States (Kriesi 
2007, 94). Some states still hold a large consensus on the benefits of European integration. 
Kriesi (2007, 83) shows that Eurosceptic mobilisation in elections has been most successful 
in Member States, where the public has always been wary of integration. The mobilisation 
against European unification can be identified to be formed more on cultural roots - rooted in 
national history and collective experiences - and prevailing antipathies towards the EU that 
have been successfully utilised by political actors, mostly by the conservatives and the new 
populist right (ibid., 88, 95, 104). For example, in the United Kingdom the EU has been seen 
as a necessary evil at best and this suspicion has been utilised by the Conservatives as well as 
the UK Independence Party (ibid., 83, 88). These results are also confirmed by de Vries 
(2007, 376). 
Innuendos of national positions over European integration can be traced from the patterns of 
cooperation or competition in the national party systems. MEPs originating from Member 
States with a positive Europhile party system most likely receive national support for their 
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pro-integration actions in the Parliament, and thus have more freedom to deliberate their 
choices and may focus on a more overt left-right view on the issues. MEPs from countries 
with significant Eurosceptic parties have to take into consideration that the opponents of 
integration are likely to highlight their actions during elections. Representatives from 
Member States with divided party systems need to balance between these two poles. Külahci 
has divided the previous 27 Member States under these three headings (2012, 190) as shown 
below in Table 1.  
 
 
The supporting countries of the FTT are derived from the eventual group of eleven countries 
now advancing with the FTT under the umbrella on enhanced cooperation: Austria, Belgium, 
Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain (European 
Council 2014). The opponents of the FTT are not as easy to decipher as the negotiations in 
the Council are held behind closed doors. Many governments oppose the FTT if implemented 
only in parts of the EU, some even if not implemented globally (Bloomberg Businessweek 
8.11.2011). Most countries have been satisfied with staying out of the enhanced cooperation, 
but retaining an option of joining in at a later stage (European Commission 14.2.2013). 
The strongest dissident voices come from Member States that either have a special financial 
sector to protect, such as Luxemburg (BBC 22.1.2013), or negative experiences from a 
Table 1: Patterns of cooperation or competition in party systems
Europhile party systems Divided party systems
Party systems with significant 
Eurosceptic parties
Cyprus Hungary Austria
France Malta Belgium
Germany Poland Bulgaria
Italy Slovakia The Czech Republic
Luxembourg Sweden Denmark
Romania The United Kingdom Estonia
Slovenia Finland
Spain Greece
Ireland
Latvia
Lithuania
The Netherlands
Portugal
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similar tax as in the case of Sweden (Schäfer 2012, 82). The United Kingdom, Luxemburg 
and the Czech Republic abstained from the 2013 FTT Council vote, indicating a negative 
stance on the tax (The Guardian 22.1.2013). Bulgaria (Novinite.com 23.10.2012), Cyprus 
(BBC 22.1.2013), Denmark (The Copenhagen Post 3.10.2012) and Malta (Malta Today 
24.5.2012) are also opposed to the FTT. The United Kingdom even went as far to launch a 
legal challenge against the Union after the eleven Member States decided to proceed with the 
framework of enhanced cooperation (BBC 20.4.2013). 
Based on the previous Table 1 of national party system’s unity towards European integration 
and the national positions on the FTT, a following speculative Table 2 has been made to 
implicate whether an MEP might have to take extra caution in the case of the FTT vote, due 
to a possible mismatch between the MEP’s political group line and national pressures arising 
from a possible strong Eurosceptic faction and/or government views for or against the FTT. 
What we can see from the table is that MEPs from Denmark might have to wrestle between 
European and national opinions at home, whereas German MEPs might be more “free” to 
pursue more European agendas as the national political scene generally supports integration. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Possible outline for the background of the FTT vote
Easy to approve
Difficult to approve 
- MS opposition
Internal division 
- Strong Euroscepticism or 
lukewarm stance of the MS 
France Bulgaria Austria 
Germany Cyprus Belgium 
Italy The Czech Republic Estonia 
Slovenia Denmark Finland 
Spain Luxembourg Greece 
Malta Hungary 
Sweden Ireland 
United Kingdom Latvia 
Lithuania 
The Netherlands 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Slovakia 
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2.1.5 The political field: regulated capitalism vs. neoliberalism 
In order to properly analyse the attitudes of the MEPs towards the FTT, theories of the 
political parties’ orientation and opinions towards European integration need to be addressed 
as the groups are the aggregate of their Members. As the proposal for the tax is seen as a tool 
to advance economic integration and market regulation, it is important to also portray the 
underlying ideological tenets towards these elements. 
The research conducted by Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks on European integration forms 
an important background for the thesis. Their seminal work on the European Union does not 
simply handle integration but politicisation as well, and their work has both been widely cited 
and supported (e.g. Green-Pedersen 2012; Kriesi 2009; Steenbergen & Marks 2004). Two 
different political views on European integration are presented by the researchers: one of the 
left-right divide and the other of the GAL-TAN dimension.  
Picture 1: Hooghe & Marks’ framework: regulated capitalism vs. neoliberalism 
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Hooghe and Marks present a model of ‘regulated capitalism’ vs. ‘neoliberalism’, where the 
political field is divided in two different dimensions: the left-right divide ranging from social 
democracy to market liberalism; and the other of integration, ranging from nationalism to 
supranationalism, shown above in Picture 1 (Steenbergen & Marks 2004, 8-9). According to 
the researchers, these dimensions are neither fused nor orthogonal to each other. Some 
aspects of integration are absorbed into the left-right divide; then again certain aspects of 
integration are distinctly separate from the ideological dimension and thus need a dimension 
of their own. Hooghe and Marks claim that it is easier for the centre-left to support European 
integration as the debate handles market regulation over market making. The centre-left, and 
especially the social democrats, promote European-level environmental, social, 
infrastructural and redistributive policy – and thus support regulated capitalism. However, 
those on the political right are more sceptical about integration, as they only wish to combine 
maximal markets with minimal European regulation. The neoliberals strive to provoke 
national competition with a large market while avoiding supranational authority. 
(Steenbergen & Marks 2004, 9-10) 
Hooghe et al. (2004, 121) show that there is a strong relationship between the left-right 
dimension and European integration. The left has begun to favour European integration to 
gain control over markets (Gabel & Hix 2004, 109), whereas centre-right parties oppose 
environmental, cohesion or employment policies i.e. regulated capitalism (Hooghe et al. 
2004, 130). One of the main arguments from the researchers is that the main parties in the 
centre of the political field – be it social democrats, Christian democrats, liberals or 
conservatives - support integration; whereas extreme parties are found to be more Eurosceptic 
with the exception of the Green parties (ibid., 122-123).  
Even though the party positions correlate strongly with attitudes towards European 
integration, Hooghe & Marks (2009, 15) state that the left-right conflict over European issues 
is not identical to the divide at the national level as the scope for economic redistribution is 
smothered in Europe. European left-right divide is more about social regulation than 
economic redistribution because a single European model would impede on national welfare 
systems (ibid., 15-16). As the Union consists of a plethora of different social systems and 
welfare regulation types, a convergence of economic redistribution would mean a permanent 
transfer from the rich Member States in the North to the poor in the South and East (ibid., 
15). The social regulation model alienates the radical left as they see European integration as 
a one-sided capitalist project hampering national social protection (ibid., 16). Social 
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democrats are less radical in their positions as they see the benefits of building a ‘citizens’ 
Europe’ and coordinating fiscal policy, however, they are sceptical about the benefits of 
social harmonisation as well (ibid.). On top of the economic aspects, the left is also 
challenged culturally on the aspect of European integration, as cultural diversity has 
increased with the enlargement to the Central and Eastern European countries (ibid., 15). 
Thus, a second dimension, the GAL (green/alternative/libertarian) – TAN 
(traditional/authoritarian/nationalist) is shown to be a more powerful predictor of party 
positions on the issues rising from European integration (Hooghe et al. 2004, 121; Hooghe & 
Marks 2009, 16).  
 
2.1.6 The political field: the GAL-TAN divide 
The stances towards European integration are especially pronounced at the TAN 
(traditional/authoritarian/nationalist) end of the dimension (Hooghe & Marks 2009, 17). 
Parties such as the French Front Nationale or the Freiheitliche Partei from Austria oppose 
integration as it undermines national sovereignty, diminishes self-rule and introduces foreign 
ideas (ibid.). Not all conservatives vouch for European unification. According to Hooghe et 
al. (2004, 135) parties with tendencies towards the TAN end, such as the Conservatives from 
the United Kingdom, the Popular Party from Portugal, Fianna Fail from Ireland, Gaullist RPR 
from France or the Italian Forza Italia, tend to be Eurosceptical. The pull between nationalism 
and neoliberalism - between national sovereignty and gains from economic integration - is 
pronounced within the conservative parties (Hooghe & Marks 2009, 17). A clear indication 
of this internal division is the separation of the British and Czech conservatives from the 
largest centre-right European People’s Party to form their own more critical the 
Conservatives and Reformists Group. Even though a large nationalist conservative fraction 
separated from the EPP, the group still retains this internal strife between nationalism and 
neoliberalism (Hooghe & Marks 2009, 17). 
The attitudes towards European integration are not as pronounced in the GAL 
(green/alternative/libertarian) end of the dimension (Hooghe & Marks 2009, 17). However, 
the success of the TAN parties has also enhanced their opposites’, especially the green 
parties’, stances towards integration as a multi-cultural European society (ibid.). Meguid 
(2005, 347-348) classifies the greens as a niche party, originating from outside the traditional 
left-right party competition and appealing to voters across traditional partisan alignments. A 
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similar divide to the conservatives can also be witnessed within the green parties: parties that 
are more reformist and environmentalist are more prone to support integration over leftist 
green parties, wary of EU’s democratic transparency (Hooghe et al 2004, 137-138). European 
integration is not as straight-forward positive issue to the leftist parties in the GAL end due to 
the market liberal nature of European unification (Hooghe & Marks 2009, 17). 
Interestingly when elsewhere the GAL-TAN and left-right divides are not bound together in 
any particular direction, the issue of integration is more distinct in Central and Eastern 
Europe as the left-right and GAL-TAN dimensions reinforce each other. The political 
continuum in the Central and Eastern European countries runs from nationalist and social 
protectionist left-TAN to market and cultural liberal right-GAL. As the two sources of 
Western European Euroscepticism are pronounced in the left-TAN end of the political divide, 
these results might also prove to be more prominent with the case of the FTT. An alternative 
result of this polarisation is the lack of internal cohesion within the former Communist 
countries on the issue, especially in the larger S&D and ALDE groups, as agrarian parties are 
included within the Eastern European TAN parties. (Hooghe & Marks 2009, 18) 
According to Hooghe and Marks (2009, 18), the question of European integration has 
strengthened a previously secondary non-economic dimension grounding on pre-material 
values deriving from strong feelings of group membership and non-membership, thus 
enforcing political tenets such as nationality. As these issues cannot be easily accommodated 
in the traditional left-right dimension, the mainstream parties are bound to experience some 
difficulties in relating to this new issue salience (ibid.). The TAN end with Euroscepticism is 
bound to increase in salience and politicisation is likely to be more pronounced where these 
parties are prominent (ibid.). However, Bartolini (2012, 158) has criticised the GAL-TAN 
divide as less convincing as far as the economic dimension of integration is concerned. 
This thesis claims that even though the GAL-TAN model is seen as a more accurate predictor 
of party positions on European integration, the model or regulated capitalism vs. 
neoliberalism is also needed to explain the larger underlying tenets in the Parliament, 
especially behind the operation of the larger mainstream political groups of the centre-right 
European People’s Party (EPP), the centre-left Group of the Progressive Alliance of 
Socialists & Democrats (S&D) and the centrist Group of the Alliance of Liberals and 
Democrats for Europe (ALDE). The GAL-TAN divide is more suitable in describing the 
other political groups of the right-wing European Conservatives and Reformists Groups 
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(ECR), the left-leaning Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA), the leftist 
Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL), the right-
wing Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group (EFD) and the non-attached Members. As 
the political groups might form alliances across party ideology in promoting the FTT, it is 
important for the Members to frame the proposal in a style suited to their ideology and 
electorates.  
 
2.1.7 Political group attitudes towards integration 
In addition to the framework provided by Hooghe et al (2004) and Hooghe and Marks (2009), 
the European Parliament’s political groups’ views on European integration have been the 
subject of numerous studies. These studies are presented to deepen the understanding behind 
the nature of the ideological attitudes towards European integration as well as show the 
diverse nature within the groups. 
Hix and Høyland (2011, 140) claim that while the political groups in the European 
Parliament are more cohesive on a left-right dimension, they are more internally divided on 
the issue of European integration. Moreover, even though the parties on the centre-left can be 
described as moderately pro-European, the issue is not as straightforward on the centre-right 
(ibid., 138). Whereas the Christian democrats favour integration, a majority of the 
conservatives, especially in the United Kingdom and Czech Republic, are far more critical 
and favour a more nation state-led Europe (ibid.). The anti-European parties are mainly 
situated in the extreme left and right as the mainstream political elite in the centre favours 
integration (ibid.). Dividing the theoretical literature under specific political groups is not 
straightforward, as the groups are internally quite versatile and for example the EPP includes 
MEPs of conservative, Christian democratic and liberal origins 
The main drivers behind European unification have traditionally been the Christian 
democrats and liberals (Kriesi 2007, 86), although internal division on the topic has increased 
throughout the years and the addition of new Member States and parties. The Christian 
democrats, or the present day EPP, have been more closely associated with the founding of 
the European Union than any other party family and it has been easy for them to take an 
intermediate position to both cultural and economic dimensions of globalisation and 
European integration (Kriesi 2007, 87). However, the internal division of the conservative 
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group is illuminated well by Bartolini (2012, 158), who presents religious divisions towards 
European integration with the Catholics, and especially social Catholics, for the integration 
and Protestants and right-wing Christians offering less support for integration. The 
conservatives are also divided between neo-liberal and nationalist conservatives and distinct 
groups, such as post-authoritarian and Scandinavian conservatives, which needs to be taken 
into account (ibid; Gabel & Hix 2004, 109). Simultaneously, the neoliberal ELDR 
(predecessor to ALDE) became more anti-European with increased regulation (Gabel & Hix 
2004, 109). As far as the liberals are concerned, they show a division into two differing 
factions: liberal radicalism and liberal conservatism (Kriesi 2007, 87). The liberals generally 
support market liberalisation, but the two groups differ on cultural integration – liberal 
conservatives are sceptical towards accepting supranational political integration (ibid.).  
The balance in state-society-economy relations has been a priority in creating electoral 
strategies for the social democrats (Ladrech 2003, 121). Ladrech, though uniting social 
democrats, greens and post-communists as the European left, claims that one of the 
challenges of developing a clear leftist position at a European level is the national 
requirements’ heavy emphasis over European level coordination (ibid.). The left has 
culturally supported European integration, as it fits their internationalist tradition, but 
economic liberalisation is not as easy as leftist parties in government have often built strong 
national social policies they do not wish to see disturbed (Kriesi 2007, 86). However, the 
influx of new post-Communist Member States can be speculated to have changed the 
dynamic within especially the European left as party development has been starkly different 
from their western counterparts (van Biezen & Mair 2006, 104). There seems to be a division 
between the classic left, Eurosceptic and opposed to globalisation, and the modernised left, 
supporting integration (Kriesi 2007, 86). As the latter group consists of major social 
democratic parties in the Member States, such as the Labour Party in the UK, it is more in 
line with present day S&D as the former group of classic leftists can be found within the 
GUE/NGL group. 
In general, the social democratic parties in Europe have strived to shake off their images of 
old-style socialism and moved away from the traditional emphasis on government 
intervention, welfare spending and full employment (Bale 2008, 274). The socialists became 
more pro-EU as they started supporting regulated capitalism instead of national welfare 
capitalism (Gabel & Hix 2004, 109) and the current S&D is a strong promoter of integration 
together with the EPP. According to Bartolini (2012, 158), the left parties and social 
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democrats support economic integration to “reconquer the market control lost at the national 
level”. Also Bale (2008, 274) concurs that the European centre-left pursue not just taming 
and humanising capitalism, but also improving it while wrestling with constituent constraints.  
The conservatives can be seen as a total opposite from the left – supporting economic 
integration but strongly against cultural aspects of the European unification, which they see 
as a threat to national traditions and sovereignty (Kriesi 2007, 87). The conservatives are also 
divided between classic conservatives and a more radical new populist right; with the latter 
clearly against integration in both political and cultural terms (ibid.). Kriesi’s (2007, 87) 
division of the conservatives into classic conservatives and a more radical new populist right 
highlights the change in the political scene. The radical right rose in the 1980s and 1990s, 
claiming to protect the traditional (patriarchal) family values and promoting a nationalist anti-
immigration agenda (Meguid 2005, 348). The new populist right’s ideology is not primarily 
Eurosceptic, but opposing integration fits into a general defence of national privileges, anti-
establishment and anti-immigration (Kriesi 2007, 87). 
Deciphering the divides between MEPs in their view on the European integration might not 
be a case of simple political party associations. The national political party stances towards 
European integration are carried into the supranational European party groups. As already 
described before, political parties’ attitudes towards the EU are also divided within countries 
and European-level political groups. Bartolini (2012, 158-159) suggests a new partisan-
genetic map on party orientations towards the Union by dividing the political players around 
four juxtapositions with the latter position supporting integration: the economic left versus 
the economic right (supporting the supranational market), periphery versus centre, rural 
versus urban and ecology versus growth. Based on these dichotomies, Bartolini continues 
(ibid.) that the conservatives should support integration as they are pro-market, urban and 
growth-orientated; the socialists should support integration as they are urban and growth-
orientated, but their precedence of welfare above markets can also cause strong internal 
tension about integration; liberals should be pro-integrationist as they are growth-orientated, 
pro-market and urban - except when originating outside urban areas such as the Finnish 
Centre Party; the left and greens should be negative towards integration as they are generally 
seen as anti-market, ecological and urban; and finally the rural or centre parties should be 
sceptic about integration. 
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Drawing on the theoretical literature presented above, the following ideological tenets in the 
political groups presented in Table 3 might appear as influential factors in the individual 
MEPs speeches in regard to economic integration, especially in the case of the FTT.  In line 
with Hooghe and Marks’ theory, whereas political groups on the right might find it hard to 
accept the tax due to free market and nationalist arguments, groups on the left might refer to 
the beneficial nature of economic regulation. The issue of the financial transaction tax is most 
likely simplest to approve for the Greens/EFA despite a small leftist anti-integration element, 
and simplest to reject by the right-wing ECR and EFD. The leftist S&D and GUE/NGL are 
likely to ideologically approve the proposal, even though representatives of the leftist 
GUE/NGL are sceptical towards increasing European integration. The question might be 
most difficult for the centrist ALDE and centre-right EPP due to ideological constraints of 
anti-regulation. ALDE’s internal heterogeneity can also be visible in the rural parties’ 
representatives’ wariness towards increasing integration. 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 3: The political groups and possible visible ideological tenets on the FTT
EPP Anti-regulation, free market ideology, nationalism, internal division on integration
S&D Anti-market, social protectionism
ALDE Anti-regulation, anti-integration, nationalism
ECR Nationalism, anti-integration, Free market ideology
GREENS/EFA Anti-integration, anti-market
GUE/NGL Anti-market, anti-integration
EFD Nationalism, anti-integration
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2.2 POLITICISATION 
Politics is most commonly defined through conflict and competing interests (Paloheimo & 
Wiberg 2008, 15) and the Merriam-Webster dictionary (2014) describes politicisation as 
relating e.g. an idea or issue to politics in a manner that makes citizens less likely to agree 
and/or to make someone involved or interested in government or politics. Theories of 
politicisation provide an important feature for the thesis in describing why politicians engage 
in political competition and how politicisation occurs in the European context, what is the 
impact of national pressures in politicisation and how has European integration advanced 
with its help. These questions are addressed in the following section before heading on to the 
third section of the political groups. 
 
2.2.1 Politicisation as a driver of integration  
Hooghe and Marks claim (2009, 1) that European integration has become politicised through 
elections and referendums. According to them, it is not the supranational technical elite that 
are in charge of European unification, instead public preferences and national political parties 
play a decisive role as the European debate is connected to the domestic political conflict 
(ibid., 1-2). This assumption is also supported by the ‘sleeping giant’ thesis that assumes that 
the public opinion is the source for EU contestation (de Vries 2007, 366). Politicisation in the 
European Union has increased over the past decades and the Eurosceptic parties have 
generally been seen as the primus motor in mobilising contestation over European 
integration, challenging the pro-integrationist main parties (Miklin 2014, 1199). However, 
although the Euro crisis has made financial issues more salient to the general public, the 
potential for politicisation still remains restricted, as the mainstream parties are still often 
seen to dominate the public discourse on economic integration (ibid.). 
According to Hooghe and Marks, politicisation has changed the content and the decision-
making process of European integration (2009, 8). As the general public can generally be 
seen to lack knowledge of their personal economic interests and benefits from European 
integration, they are susceptible to outside influence and Hooghe and Marks state that the 
electorates are prone to rely on cues provided either by ideology, political parties, media or 
intermediary institutions (ibid., 10). Political contestation is shaped by identity, not calculable 
rational economic utility. Instead of the public seeing integration as a simple passage to lower 
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transaction costs or economic gains; the EU is seen as another tier of multi-level governance, 
enabling interaction across national borders while also undermining national sovereignty. 
Economic losers are also somewhat more likely to feel culturally threatened, which makes 
them more responsive to Eurosceptic narratives. (Hooghe & Marks 2009, 1-2, 11) 
Advancing European integration and the building of the European Union have both created 
an impetus for politicisation and as the mainstream political parties have been building the 
Union, it is the smaller political actors that noticed their window of opportunity in the issue 
(e.g. Hooghe & Marks 2009, 19-20). Drawing their support from the more Eurosceptic 
public, the smaller parties in the left and right were able to raise the question of integration 
into public awareness and frame it according to their ideology: be it antipathy to capitalism or 
a defence of national sovereignty (ibid., 21). Stable national identities still remain, providing 
a platform against European integration and creating issue salience and a possibility for 
politicisation (Kriesi 2009, 221).  
Even though taxation can hardly be seen as the most media appealing topic, the case of the 
Financial Transaction Tax in the European Parliament has many facets that can be rendered 
political and interesting to the constituencies. The framing of the issue according to one’s 
ideological or national background is not hard considering the fact that even the field of 
economics is divided on the issue. No matter what politicians think of the tax, they have 
scientific research to back his or her arguments. The largest potential for political contestation 
and thus, politicisation, in the proposal for a FTT lies is the strife between European and 
national level decision-making: the proposal can easily be viewed as a threat to national 
sovereignty with traits of federalism such as more pronounced own resources for the Union 
bypassing the Member States, more supranational control and harmonisation over national 
financial markets and spreading the influence of the EU beyond its competencies. However it 
is similarly as easy for its proponents to politicise it with attacking the financial sector and the 
‘greedy’ bankers, promoting fairness and solidarity or calling out for the improved 
functioning of the financial and single markets. 
 
2.2.2 Politicisation in the European Union 
Politicisation in EU issues has no single definition or analytic framework (Statham & Trenz 
2013, 966). The field is more focused on the distinct forms and functions of politicisation, 
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including in its main forms the increase in political conflict and party politics, the dominance 
of politicians over technocrats and increasing public awareness (ibid.). The main functions 
include (re)structuring political conflict, underlining the democratic deficit and influencing 
the integration and character of the Union (ibid.). All of these traits are apparent in the case of 
the FTT: the political groups and politicians both at a national and European level are 
activated on the question instead of the Commission having a significant role. The proposal is 
presented in the light that suits each political actor’s agenda and electorate – whether they are 
for or against the FTT and thus, more economic and financial integration.  
Two elements need to appear in order for political contestation to activate: the political 
tension must be salient for the public and political entrepreneurs must mobilise on that 
tension. Both elements are apparent in the European integration, making it a prime target for 
politicisation: European integration advances in scope and depth and its effects are felt 
nationally via immigration and economic competition. Secondly, public opinion on European 
integration are susceptible to political construction as abstract concepts like identity, culture 
and economic insecurity need to be constructed in relation to integration instead of inducing 
them directly from experience. Construction through priming (bringing forth issue salience), 
framing (connecting the consideration to a political target) and cueing (instilling bias) is 
especially influential to citizens without strong prior attitudes. These politicisation 
construction frames are used in the analysis of the discourses. (Hooghe & Marks 2009, 13) 
The question of European integration offers a convenient issue of structural tension, around 
which it is easy for political actors to pursue their own goals (Statham & Trenz 2013, 967). 
The tension is created around a mismatch between the advancing scope and influence of the 
EU and national identities and ideas (ibid.). Political actors that are not among the governing 
elite pursuing European integration, have an incentive to pursue changing the political status 
quo, resulting in electoral change (de Vries 2007, 367). In order to achieve this, the parties 
need to (re)phrase the potentially divisive issues into topics and discourses matching their 
own ideology to upset an existing majority (ibid.). Contestation can also be provoked by 
critical moments – an exogenous event prompting partisan competition (ibid.). The Financial 
Transaction Tax provides impetus for both opportunity structures. After the issue has been 
phrased according to the ideology of choice, the next steps involve extending this action to 
the voters: party priming, framing and cueing make voters aware of party differences in the 
issue as well as care for the topic (ibid.).  
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Politicisation can also be seen as a positive issue (Papadopoulos & Magnete 2010, 714). A 
thesis of normalisation is rising to accompany the Eurosceptic debate (Statham & Trenz 
2013, 969). Increasing criticism against the Union does not necessarily equate with a debate 
about whether to be ‘in or out of the EU’, instead it can also be seen as a new discourse of 
‘what kind of Europe’; rendering the EU as another level of politics and administration 
(ibid.). The polarisation between political actors and how they frame their stances in political 
questions is not only a question on a simple axis of ‘for or against’ but political discourse is 
also formed around legitimating ideas, enabling the politicians to stand out from each other 
(ibid., 978). In Statham and Trenz’s study (ibid.) the political actors can agree on a certain 
topic but still frame it in a manner that appeals to their constituents, leading to increased 
thematic politicisation. This is also something, which is expected to be visible throughout the 
political debate over the FTT. 
Some researchers (e.g. Papadopoulos & Magnete 2010, 711-712) claim that the debate on EU 
politicisation should also take into consideration its consociational nature, namely the 
institutional structure created to respond to the heterogenous socio-cultural background of the 
Union. The 28 (in 2012 27) Member States of very different cultures, traditions and political 
traits challenge the institutional design and operation and the preservation of the societies’ 
vital interests are often mediated through power fragmentation and institutional checks and 
balances (ibid.). Consociational mechanisms are seen to tame politicisation through for 
example multiple veto points, cooperative mechanisms and behaviour, thus helping to avoid 
deadlocks arising from institutional competition (ibid., 714, 716). 
The role of the mass media in conveying the message unto the general public cannot be 
overlooked while discussing the politicisation of EU integration. Researchers have shown 
growing interest in explaining EU-level politicisation over integration by examining the way 
the political actors frame issues and mobilise their claims in the media (Statham & Trenz 
2013, 969). Whether taking a normative view in seeing the mass media as a possibility for the 
public to address the democratic deficit of the Union through politicisation (e.g. Risse 2010) 
or seeing the media as a site for political contestation, where politicians and parties strive to 
seek support by mobilising their claims to the public (Staham & Trenz 2013, 969), the media 
offers an outlet for political discourse to access the national electorates and vice versa, for the 
public to gain information of EU-level decision-making (ibid.).  
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2.2.3 Party competition and contestation 
Whether it is the mainstream parties or the smaller niche Eurosceptic parties that control the 
agenda and pace of politicisation remains contested in research. Hooghe and Marks assume 
that political questions and topics become politicised when party leaders see electoral 
advantage in doing so (2009, 19). However, there are three (dis)incentives for political actors 
to engage in political contestation: the position of the party in relation to other parties and the 
constituents on the issue; the ideological reputation of the party; and the internal unity or 
division of the party on the topic (ibid.).  
Many claim that it is the mainstream parties that control the access of political issues into the 
public agenda (e.g. Green-Pedersen 2012). The internal division of especially the larger 
political groups hinders the possibilities for politicisation (Green-Pedersen 2012, 119). As 
integration is often an issue causing internal party disagreements (ibid.), in order to prevent 
party conflicts the mainstream parties prefer to avoid them. For example, the contrary 
opinions towards the FTT inside the EPP group might impact the way their representatives 
frame the issue of the tax. Supporting the views presented by Hooghe and Marks, the larger 
political parties often find the issue of European integration unattractive because it impedes 
with coalition-building as positions of integration differ from the traditional left-right 
dimension; and as the voter behaviour is tightly bound with issue framing, the electoral 
impacts of politicisation are hard to predict (Green-Pedersen 2012, 115). The latter fact 
creates an impetus for political operators to frame the topic of the FTT as much in their 
favour as they can to maximise their vote shares. If these coalition-building and voter 
confidence conditions are met, the mainstream parties also have an incentive to politicise the 
question (ibid., 120-121).  
Although the behaviour of the mainstream parties influences the potential for smaller political 
actors through party tactics, the newer niche parties are able to transform the ownership of 
topics for party competition and alter issue salience for the public (Meguid 2005, 347). While 
the major parties in current political systems have low incentives to reshuffle political 
contestation, small marginal parties have nothing to lose in trying to win for more votes – 
especially during the euro crisis inflicting the citizens while most European governments toed 
the EU austerity line (Hooghe et al. 2004, 124).  
Political contestation and politicisation does not necessarily equate along the left-right 
polarisation as compromises are indispensable in the European Parliament due to the lack of a 
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government-opposition or majoritarian structure (Papadopoulos & Magnete 2010, 726). Even 
though political strategy is an important factor behind party contestation over European 
integration, ideology also has a significant role (e.g. Conti 2007). Political ideology can be 
derived directly from the question of European integration, especially with the Eurosceptic 
parties, or for example from economic or environmental values with integration assessed 
based on those values (ibid., 202). Where integration is a core aspect of party ideology, the 
stances of the political actors are prone to be more pronounced than with parties considering 
integration as more of a tool or obstacle to the implementation of their political targets (ibid.). 
The Eurosceptics are not just against EU policies but against the whole ideology behind the 
construction of the Union as European integration is fundamentally a market-liberal project 
with some regulation (Hooghe et al. 2004, 125). The left can oppose integration due to 
economic ideology, the right due to nationalist reasons.  
 
2.2.4 National influence on EU-level politicisation 
National sovereignty is often defended with the EU’s principle of subsidiarity. The principle 
is fairly simple in its basic idea of keeping decisions as close to the citizens as possible: 
allowing the Union to act if a problem cannot be effectively addressed at a national level; and 
guarding national sovereignty when EU interference does not increase effectiveness or 
enhance the outcome (Baldwin & Wyplosz 2012, 91). In practice interpreting when the 
subsidiarity clause should be invoked or not is a simple question. It is clear that the division 
between European and national policy spheres has long been blurring. What many national 
party leaders see as problematic in keeping European politics out of the domestic issue 
agenda, is unanticipated events but also the events that have long been drawing closer to a 
clash between the different levels of policy-making. Taxation offers one dimension, as it has 
mainly been left in the Member States hands but with an open back door for Union meddling. 
The political clashes between EU and domestic politics offer salient targets for politicisation. 
(van der Eijk & Franklin 2004, 49) 
The political system of the Member State also influences whether contestation is more easily 
achievable or not. Politicisation can be integrated along the existing left-libertarian versus 
traditional-authoritarian divides, described by e.g. Hooghe and Marks’ GAL-TAN divide 
(Brinegar et al. 2004, 86). Countries where the national economic welfare model is either one 
of a liberal-residual system with minimal state intervention or an encompassing and 
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redistributive one from the other end, issues of European Union reinforce existing political 
alignments (ibid.). In countries with conservative welfare systems or laggard economic 
development, politicisation is more likely to cross-cut existing divides, while however, not 
becoming highly salient and divisive (ibid.). It is also believed that EU questions are more 
easily politicised in the post-Communist Member States due to their politico-administrative 
traditions and emphasis on national politics, but the issue is contested (Fink-Hafner 2014, 39, 
51). The importance of national political contestation to issue politicisation on a European 
level is not insignificant. Topics on the European agenda have meaning to the national 
constituents, visible even in national elections. De Vries (2007, 364) clarifies that when the 
extent of partisan conflict and the degree of EU issue salience is high among the electorate, 
voting based on EU topics is more likely to occur.  
Even though the political continuum has been presented through many new proposals and 
ideas, the left-right divide still persists (Steenbergen & Marks 2004, 4). Through political 
ideology, parties and politicians are able to reduce vast differences in citizen’s attitudes and 
positions into an easily utilisable small number of dimensions (Gabel & Anderson 2004, 16). 
The constituents have strong policy preferences on the left-right division as well as on 
European integration (ibid., 30), thus organising political action and discourse distinctly 
among those divisions is useful for a politician in order to deliver his or her message with the 
most effiency. If the political group or national position inhibits the MEP in operating to the 
full extent on this scale, it is still possible for the parliamentarian to frame the issue of the 
FTT catering to his or her constituency. The political battle is often a battle of how to frame 
the issue (van der Eijk and Franklin 2004, 50). 
Van der Eijk and Franklin (2004, 32-33) note, that the European electorates’ opinions about 
integration are politicised, but not via a single framework of what political movement goes 
together with a distinct view on integration. In some Member States it is the right that is 
sceptical about European unification, in some countries it is the left (ibid.). In the case of the 
FTT, this may heighten the internal ideological divisions towards integration. In fact, the 
researchers note that European integration is more salient as an issue of politicisation than the 
traditional left-right divide (ibid., 39). The voters have more diverse and extreme opinions 
about EU integration, so it is a more prominent opportunity structure for political operators to 
compete and politicise (ibid., 47). This possibility is already utilised by the extreme left and 
right anti-EU parties, strategically utilising the political potential created by the more 
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Eurosceptic electorates as opposed to the pro-integrationist political elite (de Vries 2007, 
368). 
Kriesi claims (2007, 85) that a new structural cleavage concerning European integration has 
appeared for voters. The winners of European unification, the cosmopolitans, business and 
highly educated, continue supporting integration. The probable losers of integration, citizens 
with strong national attachments and from traditionally protected employment sectors, are 
more likely to oppose integration and also immigration. It is this latter group’s fears and 
interests, where Eurosceptic parties draw their support from. (Kriesi 2007, 85) 
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2.3 ORGANISERS OF INTERESTS - THE POLITICAL GROUPS 
The political groups in the European Parliament are closest to the MEPs, gathering the 
individual politicians under their wings and providing them with instructions and support on 
how to operate within the institution. As power in the Parliament depends on the size and 
alliance-building between groups, the groups are faced with credibility pressures arising from 
decreasing internal cohesion. As it is in each groups’ interests to keep their members toeing 
to the group line, institutional pressures may highlight possible tensions between national and 
supranational level politics. Research on the political groups’ nature and functioning in the 
European Parliament is presented to shed light on the supranational institutional influence on 
the actions of the MEPs. 
 
2.3.1 The political groups in the Parliament 
The role of political parties in the democratisation and integration of political systems is still 
vital centuries after their genesis (Lord 1998, 1). Political parties are often described as the 
organised expression of societal cleavages; representing specific groups, ideologies or acting 
as general catch-all organisations (Gaffney 1996, 3). The main cleavages in national politics 
in Europe have been those of religion, nationalism and social class (ibid.). Political parties 
strive to influence the political process and at best, gain governmental power and in order to 
achieve this they either compete or cooperate with other parties (ibid.). The European 
Parliament is the institution of the EU where the focus is on partisan identification and 
activities (Ladrech 2003, 115). The Parliament’s Members are elected nationally and the 
political groups can be regarded as self-consciously partisan in the Parliament’s internal 
operation (ibid.). 
Political behaviour in the Parliament is dominated by the political groups (Hix & Høyland 
2011, 142). In separation of the transnational party federations outside the Parliament that 
comprise of national parties spanning outside EU borders, the political groups in the 
Parliament act as a link between the party federations and the MEPs as well as offer a 
political home to individual MEPs outside their party federations (Gabel & Hix 2004, 95). 
The groups are highly developed organisations with internal rules, budgets, leadership 
structures, staff, committees and working groups (Hix & Høyland 2011, 140). The political 
groups assist in – and simultaneously guide – the MEPs operations in the legislature with 
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national delegations, voting lists, whips, group meetings and information sharing (Hix & 
Høyland 2011, 143; Gabel & Hix 2004, 95).  
The main ideological currents found in European politics are also present in the European 
Parliament: Christian democrats, conservatives, socialists, the radical left, liberals, greens, 
right-wing and the Eurosceptic parties (Lord 1998, 5). These ideological currents were 
represented in the European Parliament’s seventh term between 2009 and 2014 by the 
following seven political groups plus a group of non-attached politicians: Group of the 
European People’s Party (EPP), Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists & Democrats 
(S&D), Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE), Group of the 
Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA), European Conservatives and Reformists 
Groups (ECR), Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left 
(GUE/NGL) and the Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group (EFD) (European Parliament 
2014a). The seats during the vote on the FTT were allocated as in Table 4: 
 
 
The political groups are usually drawn on an ideological map similar to Picture 2 below 
(European Parliament 2014c), which gives some indications as to how the parties are 
distributed on a left-right continuum. Although the groups are quite loosely drawn on the 
ideological divide, the left-right dimension became more visible as the European Union 
became more politicised after the Maastricht Treaty in the early 1990s and emergence of 
salient political issues, such as economics and environment on a European scale (Ladrech 
1996, 296-297). The same ideological sharpening might be speculated to emerge as 
integration deepens with the introduction of previously unchartered policy areas, such as the 
FTT. 
Table 4: Seats allocated to the political groups in May 2012
EPP 269
S&D 189
ALDE 84
Greens/EFA 59
ECR 53
GUE/NGL 33
EFD 33
NI 32
Total 752
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Picture 2: The political groups in the European Parliament 
 
2.3.2 The political groups in the European Parliament during the FTT vote 
The Group of the European People’s Party (EPP) was the largest political group in the 
Parliament with 269 Members during the vote on the FTT in May 2012. Bringing together 
centre and centre right pro-European MEPs from conservative and Christian democrat 
origins, the group’s targets include advancing a more competitive and democratic Europe and 
social market economy (EPP Group 2014b). The EPP has been a motive force of European 
integration since the 1950s, including many of the founding fathers of the Union (EPP Group 
2014a). Being the largest political group in the Parliament since 1999, the EPP enjoys a 
significant position in the internal power structure of the Parliament (ibid.). 
The second largest group in the European Parliament, the Group of the Progressive Alliance 
of Socialists & Democrats in the European Parliament (S&D), was the leading centre-left 
political group with 189 Members of mainly social democratic origins during the FTT vote 
(S&D Group 2014b). The group emphasises social values, employment, democracy and 
financial reform with fairness in their values (S&D Group 2014a). Like the EPP, the 
socialists have been a permanent fixture in the Parliament since its beginning and until 1999, 
were the largest group in the Parliament (European Parliament 2014a). 
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The Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) was the third 
largest political group with 84 Members. Founded in 1976 anticipating the first public 
elections of 1979 to the Parliament, the centrist group forms an umbrella for European liberal 
democrats (ALDE 2014b). The group’s values include promoting the single market and free 
trade, promoting European democracy, environmental topics and agriculture (ALDE 2014c). 
The inclusion of different parties from the rural and periphery, centre and liberal background, 
leaning both left and right (ALDE 2014a), has made the group less unified in its ideology. 
The Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance (The Greens/EFA) encompasses both the 
green parties and regional parties and it was the fourth largest group with 59 Members in 
2012. The difficulty in the 1999 formed political alliance lies in the different nature of the 
two groups of MEPs: others focused on regional aspects and self-determination to stateless 
nations; whereas the others are predominantly environmentalist in their orientation (EFA 
2014). However what the MEPs share in addition to these topics is the interest in human 
rights, opposition to racism and xenophobia and promotion of social justice making it a fairly 
coherent group (ibid.). 
The European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECR) was formed in 2009 with the lead 
of the British and Czech Conservatives as the pro-integrationist stance of the EPP became 
unbearable to them (ECR 2014). During the FTT vote, the Group consisted of 53 Members of 
conservative origins. The Group can in general be described as a more national-orientated 
political affiliation, vouching for economic integration whilst underlining the principle of 
subsidiarity (ibid.).  
The Confederal Group of the European United Left – Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) with its 
34 Members is the most leftist group in the Parliament, comprising Members from leftist and 
communist parties (GUE/NGL 2014b). The Group speaks strongly against the elite-led 
market-orientated nature of the European integration and for human rights, solidarity and 
social equality (GUE/NGL 2014a). 
The Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group (EFD) was the smallest political group during 
the FTT vote with 33 Members. A group of somewhat scattered origins, the EFD strives to 
prevent the ‘creation of a single centralised European superstate’ by opposing integration and 
increasing the power of the citizens in EU-level decision-making through e.g. referenda (EFD 
2014a). Even though the group states to reject xenophobia and racism (ibid.), many of its 
Members draw their support from these origins (EFD 2014b). 
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The so-called Non-Attached 32 Members (NI) remained outside the political groups, usually 
due to their unacceptable nature or background in an openly racist party, such as the 
Hungarian Jobbik or the Partij voor de Vrijheid from the Netherlands (European Parliament 
2014c). 
 
2.3.3 The internal cohesion of the groups 
Even though the European Parliament encompasses all of the ideological tenets that feature in 
most national political scenes, the heterogeneous political groups are not as easily dispersed 
on a simple political continuum from left to right (e.g. Attinà 1998, 20). As the Parliament is 
not formed around a government-opposition dichotomy but instead all of the seats are 
allocated according to the size of the political groups (Hix & Høyland 2011, 54), European 
political groups have constantly grown in size to gain more power (e.g. Bartolini 2012).  
In order to grow larger, the political groups must also accept members that are not tightly 
within the group’s ideological core, although in general the political groups have structured 
along a left-right alignment (Bartolini 2012, 162). The heterogeneity of the political groups 
seems to have gone without electoral reward or punishment, so ideological constraints have 
been easier to cast aside (Bartolini 2012, 161-162). In addition to the fact that it is in the 
political group’s incentives to grow large and gain more power, it is also in the MEPs 
interests to join a large group with more power in the Parliament (Hix & Høyland 2011, 143). 
As the Parliament’s influence over policy outcomes has increased, the representatives have 
been willing to ignore ideological cohesion for power. 
Thomassen et al. (2004, 162) show that cohesiveness in the European Parliament in issues 
concerning the left-right dimension is higher than in other issues, including integration. In 
general, the smaller groups are more cohesive than their larger counterparts (ibid., 151). The 
researchers also enlighten some divisions between the MEPs inside the political groups (ibid., 
160): the original six Member States and South Europeans are more Europhiles, whereas their 
Nordic and UK counterparts are more sceptical about integration. In addition, Thomassen et 
al. (ibid.) group the left-right dimension in a distinctive north-south divide based on different 
European welfare models ranging from the Nordic to South European Christian and the 
distinctive British model. Especially in the two large groups PPE and ELDR (the 
predecessors of EPP and ALDE) nationality explains much of the internal variance (ibid.). 
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The research was published already in 2004, before the accession of the Eastern European 
and Mediterranean islands, which might have already influenced the dynamics inside the 
political groups. 
Although the left-right dimension structures the Parliament (Hooghe & Marks 2009, 15), it is 
apparent that the internal cohesion of the political groups in the Parliament is weaker than 
within parties in national Parliaments, whether observed via voting patterns or organisational 
design, and thus strong partisan blocs are harder to form or maintain (Ladrech 1998, 55). 
Even though some might see this as a weakness and an obstacle to legislative efficiency 
(ibid.), it is also a possibility for the political groups to form issue-based alliances and 
coalitions to drive forward initiatives across ideological barriers. 
 
2.4.4 Alliance building 
Political groups with low internal cohesion, especially in the area of integration, have strong 
incentives to strengthen their internal division of labour and whip the MEPs into following 
group line at votes to maximise their own powers in the Parliament (Hix & Høyland 2011, 
143). Nevertheless, the groups are often ineffective in preventing particular national 
delegations from defecting in key votes (ibid.). This is confirmed also by Ladrech (2003, 
115-116), who states that even though Member State opinions are transmitted through 
national delegations the internal party group discipline is visibly growing. Forming alliances 
is more effective, when the MEPs can be credibly persuade according to the political group 
guidelines. 
The increasing partisan nature and competition in the European Parliament has been blurred 
by the cooperation of the two largest groups, EPP and S&D, dedicated to enhancing the 
Parliaments powers vis-à-vis the Council. The ‘grand alliance’ between the two political 
groups is often the driving force behind accepted Commission proposals, as the groups form 
a majority of the MEPs. Then again it is not unusual, that other kinds of issue-based alliances 
are formed or that the nature of the dominant coalition changes after the European elections: 
the increased politicisation over the Stability and Growth Pack and employment issues broke 
old alliances after the 1999 elections. The S&D lost their majority, EPP became the largest 
group and then turned to ALDE to form a new alliance. This in turn led the Socialists to the 
Greens. The shifting nature of political alliances is clear. (Ladrech 2003, 116) 
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Based on Hooghe & Marks’ and Bartolini’s theoretisations, a stronger divide between the 
political groups should have been apparent. However, as the competition between political 
groups has grown alliances are built issue by issue (Hix & Høyland 2011, 144). As the case 
of the FTT shows, ideological constraints or disagreements have not been an obstacle to 
alliance building. The final vote in accepting the FTT happened with the coalition of the EPP, 
S&D, Greens/EFA & GUE/NGL (Votewatch Europe 2014a) bridging the left-right divide on 
the issue. 
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2.5 THE MEPS AS RATIONAL ACTORS 
Finally, after covering theoretical literature on integration, politicisation, political groups and 
national influence, the politicians themselves deserve a separate look. The fourth and final 
theoretical section covers the theoretical foundation from new institutionalism, more 
precisely rational choice institutionalism, which illuminates the micro-level forces behind the 
MEPs’ behaviour. Research from the MEP’s roles and identities, micro-level political tenets, 
national impact and strategic voting highlight the intricate web of influential factors on the 
representatives’ decision-making. 
 
2.5.1 Rational politicians within institutions 
The theoretical framework on the behaviour of the MEPs is loosely drawn from the field of 
rational choice institutionalism. Rational choice institutionalists, distinct from rational choice 
economists, do not see individuals motivated simply by economic rationalities of utility-
seeking; researchers have acknowledged that rules and norms also play a part in explaining 
political action (Lowndes & Roberts 2013, 35). Human beings are not rational machines but 
make mistakes and are sometimes bound by the rules around them (ibid., 37). Even though 
individual politicians might not always act ”rationally”, i.e. to maximise their own utility, 
politicians en masse strive to become re-elected. From this assumption a fundamental concept 
of utility as re-election is drawn. Both the Parliament and the political groups can be regarded 
as institutions in relation to the MEPs. 
Rules, practices and narratives within institutions guide the behaviour of their members 
(Lowndes & Roberts 2013, 76). Some researchers even see the institutions influencing the 
behaviour of their members by shaping their values, norms, interests, identities and beliefs 
(March & Olsen 1989, 17). Although rational choice institutionalists do not believe that 
institutions per se cause the behaviour of its members, they are prone to see institutions 
inflicting limitations and influencing the incentives for its members (Lowndes & Roberts 
2013, 49). Social obligation and binding expectations create compliance through a logic of 
appropriateness (ibid., 60). Appropriateness is constructed through the internal practices of 
what is reasonable, good and eligible (March & Olsen 1989, 4). Even though a politician 
might not seek to maximise their utility through targeting re-election, utility can also be 
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drawn from adhering to these internal structures of logic of appropriateness and gaining in 
internal political group appreciation. 
Regulative, normative and discursive mechanisms all shape the action of the agents inside the 
institutions (ibid., 50). Formally constructed and recorded rules, such as laws, are important 
to this study in the sense that the research target is a rule in the making (Lowndes & Roberts 
2013, 52). However, when researching the framing and phrasing of the discourse and the 
voting decisions made by the MEPs, it is the practices and narratives that are more 
interesting. Informal institutional rules, or practices, are to be seen separate from personal 
habits and they have the following traits: a specific setting, recognised by actors, have a 
collective effect and they can be described and explained e.g. to a researcher (ibid., 47). The 
style and form of discourse in the plenary debate can be seen to follow a specific set of 
practices, which is evident for example in the choice of phrasing, wording and style of the 
speeches. Political narratives, expressed in the speeches of the MEPs, are especially central to 
this study in how the politicians call for or resist the FTT; what stories are told to plea to the 
electorates and colleagues; or how the tax is connected with political ideology or national 
sentiments (ibid., 52-53). 
When discussing political strategy, common belief systems can be seen to enhance elite 
coalitions as well as providing power to fulfil its strategic goals (Lowndes & Roberts 2013, 
100). Some researchers place an emphasis on creative agents, engaging in the process of 
convincing the constituency of their targets (ibid., 101). Entrepreneurial members frame 
proposals so that they appeal to differently motivated groups inside and outside the 
institution, thus building support for their cause (ibid., 174). Be it belief systems or individual 
actors, these persuasions and political strategies can be examined through the pollicisation of 
discourses and narratives in the plenary debate. 
 
2.5.2 MEP roles and identities  
The Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) can in general be described as more 
orientated towards the European level. In comparison to their national counterparts, the MEPs 
see the European Union as an emerging state and, instead of the national legislators, they 
prefer the European Parliament to influence EU decisions (Katz 1999a, 42-43). According to 
Katz (ibid.,), these differences are apparent across and within national samples, but some 
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differences exist: for example the old and large Member States can be seen as more 
European. However these national differences disappear almost entirely once the 
Parliamentarian’s attitudes towards e.g. the preferred Council decision rule, a personal sense 
of Europeanness, the relative satisfaction with democracy at a European level or the belief 
whether the decisions made by the European Union are in the interest of their own country, 
are taken into consideration (ibid.,). The last point is of special interest in the case of the FTT. 
If an MEP feels himself or herself as distinctly European and beliefs that the tax benefits their 
country, judged for example by the ideological background of the MEP, will he or she be 
more prone to support it despite national negative stances?  
The question can be investigated through a more profound analysis on how the MEPs see 
themselves as representatives – and by dividing the Parliamentarians into specific groupings 
by their attitudes and roles towards the European Union and integration. Katz (1999b, 70-71) 
discovered that the MEPs role orientations can be divided into three different roles: that of a 
pro-European legislator, a nationalist partisan and of a generally representative 
communitarian. The European identity of the MEP and their general outlook on the Union 
can override national attitudes (Hix & Høyland 2011, 143). However, representatives who 
sees themselves with a partisan role are more inclined to favour national sentiments and less 
integration than their counterparts with a legislator role – who prefer more integration and 
stronger powers for the Parliament and Commission (ibid., 80-83). The communitarians can 
be found somewhere in the middle: positive on the form, although not on the substance as the 
legislators, and cautious towards EU policies (ibid.).  
 
2.5.3 Political divisions in the European Parliament 
Reflecting public and ideological divisions, the main dimensions of political conflict among 
the individual MEPs are the socioeconomic left-right dimension, supported by a traditional-
libertarian dimension of contestation, and the integration-independence dimension 
(Thomassen et al. 2004, 144, 153). The socioeconomic divides often run along the lines of 
the left emphasising social equality, state role and the welfare state, whereas the right prefer 
free market economy (ibid., 154). The supporting traditional-libertarian dimension relates 
more to moral issues such as abortion, immigration and topics of law and order (ibid.). 
Political contestation is not merely founded on party or group level conflict; instead it has its 
roots in individual level ideology and identities. 
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Research on the MEP’s roll call behaviour (Thomassen et al. 2004, 148-149) shows that four 
dimensions explain legislators’ voting behaviour: the left-right dimension explains for 90 % 
of the votes, confirming the importance of political ideology in the decision-making; the 
second impacting factor is the integration-independence dimension, confirming also the 
similarities between the two largest political groups (EPP and S&D); the third separates 
MEPs from the United Kingdom from the rest of the representatives; and the fourth 
dimension relates to the north-south division of the EU. These results support the claim that 
political groups have been successful in guiding the voting behaviour of their Members along 
ideological cues. 
However, the impact of national influence over Union agenda is not insignificant. The MEPs 
see the question of integration/independence more as the power and competencies of the EU 
in relation to the Member States, than a question of power distribution between EU 
institutions (Thomassen et al. 2004, 153-154). The more the EU agenda resonates with 
national aspirations and borders, the more possibilities it offers for disruptive politicisation of 
these differences (ibid., 154). Nevertheless, based on the MEP’ roll call votes party affiliation 
surpasses national importance (ibid., 157, 162). Nationality is more important than the 
political group only on the integration- independence dimension and only when all parties are 
included in the sample. This confirms the consensus over integration of the larger political 
groups, but also that the smaller – and more extreme – groups have stronger nationalist or 
anti-integration tones than the large ones.  
 
2.5.4 National aspiration’s influence to the MEPs  
One important factor behind the MEP’s decisions in the Parliament is the national 
atmosphere towards Europe and European integration. According to Bartolini (2012, 158), 
the attitudes of the national parties towards European integration are formed on quite 
permanent divides depending on whether the country is situated in the North or South, mainly 
Catholic or Protestant, one of the early Member States or one of the latecomers or depending 
on their institutional role in the government or the opposition. However, a majority of the 
parties underline a partisan view where orientation towards the EU relates to the competition 
at a national level (ibid.). The national parties are normally far from unison in their view of 
integration and the emergence of the Eurosceptic parties on the national political scenes has 
caused additional challenges to parliamentarians catering both to the European level of 
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operation and national level of their constituents. Even though almost 80 per cent of the votes 
in national elections go to the pro-European parties from the centre-left, centre-right and 
liberals, the growing Euroscepticism among European constituents is apparent (Hix & 
Høyland 2011, 138). 
National influence to the MEPs is directed via their national parties, governments, 
organisations, businesses and electorates. European Parliamentary elections were long 
claimed to be fought as ‘second-tier’ elections, as national elections fought on national topics 
instead of the European ones and without representing voter preferences about the EU (e.g. 
Kriesi 2007, 84; Ladrech 2003, 120). European elections today are not only fought on 
national agenda, but with national viewpoints on European issues. The influence of the 
national political scene and national parties is not insignificant. It is also in the national 
parties’ incentive to keep contact with their representatives in the Parliament (Ladrech 2010, 
130). The national parties, not the political groups in the European Parliament, hold the keys 
to the MEPs re-election – namely access to the candidate lists in the elections (Ladrech 2010, 
130). If the policy issue is dire enough, an MEP from a country with a closed list electoral 
system (e.g. Italy) needs to take the opinion of the party in more consideration than in an 
electoral system of candidate-centred electoral systems (e.g. Finland) (Hix & Høyland 2011, 
143-144). National parties rarely instruct their MEPs to vote opposing to the group 
instructions – either due to the ideological similarities between the two political operators or 
the low salience of the issue at national level (ibid., 143). However, when they do send 
conflicting instructions to the political groups, Hix and Høyland claim (2011, 143) that the 
MEPs adhere more to the national sentiments. 
 
2.5.5 MEPs voting strategies 
Voting in the European Parliament is not an isolated event from the national level as the 
decisions from the Union flow downwards to be implemented at a national level. As Katz 
describes it, the MEP has to also contemplate about the role of the European Parliament in 
the European political system (1999b, 61). If the MEPs can be seen to vote in a more pro-
European style, is it a reflection of self-interest or institutional socialisation towards the 
European party groups? When asked from the Parliamentarians themselves, 75 % set their 
own opinion first in determining how to vote, but they also place on average more weight on 
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party views over voter preferences (ibid., 63-65). The representatives view the party as an 
important mediator in articulating and interpreting the interests of the citizens (ibid., 65).  
The MEPs might vote in line with the political group despite their personal preferences and 
opinions. Strategy is as important as preference, when Parliamentarians ponder their voting 
choices (Katz 1999b, 64). Katz found that even though representatives hold their personal 
opinion at a high value when making decisions, this priority is unrelated to their opinions 
about the pace and depth of further integration (ibid., 80). There is a possibility that an MEP 
will vote with his or her political group for strategic reasons even if it is against his or her 
own opinion or the national stance. This is also supported by Hix & Høyland (2011, 143) as 
they state that with increased powers, the MEPs have begun to vote more on supranational 
than national lines. However, Thomassen & Schmitt offer a somewhat contradicting outlook 
(1999, 147), when they speak of the great pro-Europe consensus in the major party groups: in 
their opinion nationality surpasses party groups in importance.  
It might be fair to say that a self-conscious MEP can choose between voting strategically with 
his or her political group or according to the national sentiments. Institutional pressures from 
conforming to the pro-integrationist Parliament and/or adhering to the group line are strong. 
Then again, national actors rarely try to persuade the MEPs to vote against the group line but 
when they do, the MEPs often take it seriously due to electoral and national political 
considerations. This thesis claims that the controversial proposal of the FTT is bound to 
affect at least some of the votes of the MEPs as national interests in the question are 
heightened. Even though a politician might have ended up voting with his or her political 
group – and against national preferences – the way how the politician has justified and 
politicised the issue reflects their ideological tenets, thus trying to appeal to the electorate and 
secure re-election. 
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2.6 A RECAPITULATION OF THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The theoretical framework has strived to create a comprehensive backdrop for analysing 
especially the second research question: How do the background factors of the MEP’s 
political group, ideology and national opinions on the financial transaction tax affect their 
voting decisions and issue framing? To answer questions of influential factors behind the 
MEP’s voting decisions national impact is estimated via Member State political systems and 
their nature on European integration, possible Eurosceptic tenets and by showing the national 
roots to securing the MEP’s re-election. European integration and the FTT prove to be prime 
targets for possible politicisation targeted for the national electorates.  
The political groups act as the supranational level aggregates for political competition and 
conflict. Formed largely on similar ideological tenets as their national counterparts, theories 
of political parties’ orientation towards European integration are brought forward to represent 
the ideological influence behind politicians’ choices. Due to the special nature of the 
European Parliament, research from group cohesion and alliance building are included to 
broaden the general understanding behind Parliamentary dynamics. 
Finally, the framework includes a chapter on the politicians themselves to highlight the 
micro-level factors behind individual politicians’ decisions. Through studies of MEPs’ roles 
and identities, political divisions and strategies, the chapter portrays the representatives as 
rational utility-maximising politicians - either through securing re-election or adhering to an 
internal logic of appropriateness. 
An MEP’s voting ‘strategy’ might be as simple as following the political group voting 
recommendations without a deeper thought and protecting oneself with the group level 
shield. However, if the MEP wishes to take a stand on the issue, the theories of politicisation 
offer concrete tools in estimating how the political groups and politicians have attempted at 
advancing or toppling the proposal of the financial transaction tax. Politicisation theories are 
represented to show how politicisation occurs and whether it is seen catalysed by the large or 
small operators.  
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3 METHODS AND DATA 
3.1 AN INSTITUTIONALIST CASE STUDY 
The theoretical background chapter on rational choice institutionalism has already 
enlightened the possibility of studying the practices and discourses of the politicians as a way 
to conduct research on political behaviour (Lowndes & Roberts 2013, 47). Lowndes and 
Roberts (ibid., 48) give examples of institutionalist research methods, where both case study 
and narrative analysis are mentioned as possible methods for research. Case studies have 
often seen to dominate the methodology of new institutionalist research but, like in this thesis 
as well, increasingly originating from theoretically generated positions (ibid., 49). Narrative 
analysis can be incorporated in the case study approach for example in the form of simple 
analysis of the discourses.  
Although most rational choice institutionalists operate within quantitative methods, game 
theories or easily operationable rational utility measurements (Lowndes & Roberts 2013, 36), 
there is room for a more qualitative outlook as well – especially while conducting an in-depth 
case study. Analysing the narratives of political discourse provides a suitable method for 
unravelling hidden assumptions and background factors (ibid., 53). This research resembles 
in its background, context and focus of third phase institutionalism, where the previously 
separate theoretical perspectives of new institutionalism draw closer to each other and 
converge (ibid., 40-41). Hence the viewpoint of rational choice institutionalism is enriched 
with sociological institutionalism’s notions of rules, norms and practices and the logic of 
appropriateness. 
Rational choice institutionalism is often associated with micro-level analysis of decision-
making (Lowndes & Roberts 2013, 49), like the handling of a particular legislative proposal. 
Thus, the method of applying a case study frame on the question of the FTT seems suitable to 
reach an in-depth understanding on the issue. Case studies can be intrinsic – focusing on 
understanding a particular case instead of generalisation and theory creation – or instrumental 
– in adding insight to an issue or theory (Baxter & Jack 2008, 548-549). The case study of the 
FTT in the European Parliament is of the latter type; offering a concrete political issue to be 
mirrored against theories of party ideology and European integration; political 
entrepreneurialism and politicisation; and of rational politicians. 
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According to Baxter and Jack (2008, 544-545) qualitative case studies’ strength is in the in-
depth nature of the results, originating from the variety of data sources. The study of the FTT 
includes both quantitative and qualitative political narrative sources that, when combined, 
reveal a more comprehensive picture on the issue than if either were used as the sole method 
on the topic. Case study approach should be considered as a suitable method when intending 
to answer research questions of how and why; if the research subjects’ behaviour cannot be 
manipulated by the researcher; if uncovering contextual conditions seem relevant for the 
phenomenon; and if the boundaries between the phenomenon and context are unclear (ibid., 
545). Fitting the theoretical foundation of new institutionalism and political behaviour inside 
these frames justifies the use of case study as a method for this thesis. A political 
phenomenon cannot be interpreted or analysed separately from its surroundings nor are the 
surroundings insignificant to the research questions - especially in a case of European 
integration and with different political actors heeding to both national and supranational 
institutional pressures. 
Even though case studies are usually considered as multi-perspective analyses including 
different actors and stakeholders (Tellis 1997), due to the length limits of the thesis, only 
statements from different MEPs from all political groups have been included. Validity could 
have been increased with multiple data sources (ibid.). However, validity and reliability can 
also be improved by following a formal case study protocol and using theoretical 
relationships as a foundation for generalisations (ibid.). To provide the thesis with quality and 
trustworthiness, and ensure the reliability and validity of the research design, the following 
checklist by Baxter and Jack (2008, 556) is taken into consideration: the research question is 
clearly written and substantiated, case study design is deemed appropriate to answer those 
questions, purposeful sampling strategies for the method have been chosen, data collection 
and management is systematic and the data is analysed correctly. 
 
3.2 MIXED METHODS 
Case studies often include different methods to create a manifold image of the research 
question: on-site fieldwork combined with observation, interviews and/or document analysis 
are often among the used methods (Vromen 2010, 256). This thesis combines both 
quantitative and qualitative data and methods to answer the following research questions and 
produce as thorough results as possible within the limited space available: 
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How is the financial transaction tax presented by the Members of the European Parliament?  
How do the background factors of the MEP’s political group, ideology and national opinions 
on the financial transaction tax affect their voting decisions and issue framing?  
Baxter and Jack (2008, 554) emphasise the flexibility of the case study approach in its 
possibility to include both qualitative and quantitative research methods to create a broader 
and more in-depth picture of the research target. Each data source can be seen as a different 
part of the puzzle, contributing to a wider understanding of the phenomenon (ibid.). The use 
of mixed methods seems to be on the rise at the moment in political science (Vromen 2010, 
249). This particular case study merges these two methods into a single research design 
offering both quantitative voting data and qualitative analysis of political discourses. Whereas 
case study and narrative analysis are distinctly qualitative orientations, voting data analysis 
represents a more quantitative orientation (Vromen 2010, 258). The quantitative analysis 
portion is to decipher the Member State and political group interaction - and the debates and 
speeches of the MEPs of the strategic politicisation on the issue by individual representatives. 
Qualitative methods are usually employed to answer questions of how and why (Vromen 
2010, 251). Qualitative analysis is often used to gain an in-depth insight and understanding 
into issues and phenomena, complementing the case study approach (ibid., 255). Whereas 
quantitative methods are often used to derive generalisations, explanation is more important 
than generalisation in the qualitative orientation (ibid.). Vromen (2010, 257) describes four 
core attributes to qualitative research: inductive analysis instead of simple theory-derived 
deduction; holistic perspective instead of focusing on few variables; qualitative and 
adaptative data collection; and empathetic neutrality instead of assuming full researcher 
objectivity. In focusing on only one or few cases, qualitative research also underlines the 
importance of its cases (ibid., 256). As the research questions are more about how, the 
emphasis of the thesis is on qualitative methods and the quantitative figures are used more as 
a support for the actual analysis of the discourses. 
It is customary for political scientists to analyse texts and documents in their research, mostly 
primary sources that are original documents produced by political actors and without 
secondary interpretation or analysis (Vromen 2010, 261-262). The pursuit for understanding 
and interpreting phenomena is primarily conducted through an analysis of discourses 
(Vromen 2010, 263). Through qualitative methods researchers are able to not just study what 
is said but how it relates to wider frameworks of culture or politics (ibid., 264). There is no 
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single definition as to what are discourses and how to study them; however, Jorgensen and 
Phillips (2002, 1) propose that they should be understood as the “particular way of talking 
about and understanding the world” (original italics). The origins of analysing discourses lie 
in social constructionism and in the understanding that issues are constructed socially through 
language and culture (ibid., 3). Discourse and language are never objective reflections nor 
neutral, instead they contribute into constructing the reality we live in: physical things gain 
their significance through discourse and the creation of meaning and representation (ibid., 9). 
A very simple frame of analysis is chosen as the primary method of the thesis. The emphasis 
is in how political entrepreneurs combine political elements and discourses into their 
interpretation of the FTT, thus forming new meanings and frames for the topic in order to 
advance their own political agendas – whether derived through ideology or national opinions. 
Relevant to this research is the micro level analysis of how MEPs frame the issue of the 
Financial Transaction Tax and how different meaning and ideological traits are connected to 
the debate. The theoretical framework on politicisation offers practical tools into discovering 
the priming (bringing forth issue salience), framing (connecting the consideration to a 
political target) and cueing (instilling bias) of the political debate (Hooghe & Marks 2009, 
13). The ambiguous meaning given to the tax in the MEPs’ speeches can be researched 
through meticulous operationalisation and in-depth analysis. 
 
3.3 DATA 
Narratives can be analysed through the MEPs’ speeches (Lowndes & Roberts 2013, 53) and 
the reason why the plenary session debate and the explanation of votes are chosen, can be 
derived from Pekonen (2011, 104): whereas the debate in the Parliamentary Committees is 
often about reassuring colleagues and less about political conflict, the debate in the Plenary is 
oriented to a wider audience that culminates in “talking on record” - to enter the opinions of 
the MEPs in the minutes of the Plenary session. While conducting his research among 
Finnish Parliamentarians, the following features were seen to add or derive from the 
politicisation of the issues handled in the Parliament: the presence of the media, the 
lengthening of the speeches and the increase of ready-written speeches and “talking from 
paper” instead of an actual debate (ibid., 111). Pekonen also adds the tightening of group line 
in the votes and the increase in the personal interest for the representatives to please their 
electorates through discourse as probable consequences of politicisation in the Parliament 
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(ibid.). As the European Parliament plenary debate is already widely accessible to the media 
and public as everything is recorded and published on-line, there is reason to expect a heavier 
politicisation in the narratives. Also even though emphasis is still on the actual interaction 
and debate, some of the material can be delivered afterwards in a written form increasing the 
possibility of a strategically oriented and carefully formulated political communication.  
The material for the qualitative analysis is obtained from the European Parliament’s website, 
where all of the procedure files, committee handling, plenary session schedules, debates, 
voting results and explanation of votes are available in written form and often even in 
audiovisual form. The research targets are the May 23
rd
 debate previous to the actual voting 
session (European Parliament 2012a) and the explanation of votes instantly after the votes 
(European Parliament 2012b). By choosing both debates there is a possibility to include the 
elements of a wider discourse on the issue – first through the initial debate and then through 
the MEPs justifications for their voting decisions. It is also possible to deliver the explanation 
in writing later on to be added to the plenary minutes, which is an interesting point in 
deciphering whether they are used and if the messages differ from the oral ones, when first 
formulated in peace and delivered post-debate.  
The speeches from the two types of debate were copied from the European Parliament’s 
website and transferred into a word processor form creating 37 pages of analysable material 
from the debate and 44 pages from the explanation of votes, totalling at 81 pages of data. The 
material was then combined and divided into separate parts according to the political groups. 
By grouping the speeches together from both debates under political groups, it is easier to 
search for common features within the political groups. After the texts were separated 
according to political groups, a systematic analysis and thematic colour coding was 
performed to the speeches to discover common traits and elements in the addresses. This 
happened through reading the excerpts meticulously and searching for similar issues arising 
from the speeches. When all of the texts were coded, themes and quotes from the speeches 
were gathered under the found specific thematic headings. The analysis of the discourses was 
then completed in the form of studying not just what the politicians state, but how the MEPs 
present and justify the question of the FTT and whether they use some special rhetorical 
devices such as analogies, exaggeration or metaphors to emphasise their message even 
further. 
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The quantitative voting data is used to present numerical background information to support 
the analysis of the speeches. The voting statistics are derived from VoteWatch Europe’s site 
(2014a) on the vote on the common system for taxing financial transactions, the FTT. The 
website offers voting information from individual MEPs to political groups and national 
delegations. Their ready-made statistics from group or national cohesion are also used. The 
figures can be downloaded from the website in a spreadsheet form, enabling their easy usage 
for quantitative analysis. The voting data was retrieved and downloaded from the VoteWatch 
Europe website and then the separate spreadsheet tables were arranged for data from 
individual MEP voting results, group cohesion rates, group loyalty rates and when arranged 
by origin of country. The separate national tables handled in chapter 4.1.3 were drawn from 
the mass of the individual MEPs’ voting decisions and then regrouped under Member States. 
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4 THE FINANCIAL TRANSACTION TAX IN THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT 
 
The analysis of the proposal of the Financial Transaction Tax in the European Parliament is 
conducted in two separate parts. First, there is a quantitative analysis on the voting results to 
illustrate the tensions between national and supranational levels. In chapter 4.2 these results 
are reflected into the background literature and some preliminary notions are already drawn. 
Chapter 4.3 forms the main analysis chapter on the discourses in the plenary. The 
representatives were active in the debate before and after the vote and the themes rising from 
the discussions are strongly related to the ongoing financial crisis. The debate proceeds 
within normative frames of guilty banks and victimised citizens, functional frames of 
economic arguments and authoritarian frames of national vs. supranational. Finally, the 
discourses are connected to the theoretical background in chapter 4.4. 
 
4.1 ANALYSIS OF THE VOTING RESULTS  
4.1.1 The FTT vote on May 23rd 2012 
The plenary vote on the Commission proposal for an EU-wide Financial Transaction Tax 
took place in the Parliament on May 23
rd
 2012. 708 MEPs were present in the vote out of 752 
Members and from those present, 23 representatives chose not to vote on the question so the 
final number of voters was 685 MEPs. As Table 5 shows, the legislative proposal received 
the approval of the Parliament in the consultation process with 71 % MEPs for and 22 % 
against the proposal and 7 % abstentions.  
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Source: VoteWatch Europe 2014a  
The voting behaviour and internal cohesion divided according to political groups is shown in 
Table 6 below. The groups voting for the proposal have been shaded with grey and grouped 
in the top half of the table; the opponents of the tax are at the bottom half of the table and the 
non-attached MEPs are in the bottom row. The table shows the total amount of MEPs in the 
group as well as the numbers of actual voters, divided into separated shares according to their 
vote. Group cohesion percentage in the FTT vote is also shown in Table 6, as well as the 
general group cohesion percentage in economic and monetary matters during the 
Parliamentary term of 2009-2014 as a comparison (VoteWatch Europe 2014b). Cohesion is 
used to measure the MEP’s voting behaviour as a block and the higher the number, the more 
unified the group is (VoteWatch Europe 2011). The rates are calculated by comparing the 
individual MEP votes to the group and the span ranges from 0 (group is split down the 
middle in the vote) to 100 (all members vote similarly) (ibid.). 
 
Source: VoteWatch Europe 2014a  
Table 5: The Parliament vote on the FTT May 23rd 2012
Total members 752
Voters 685
Didn't vote 23
Absent 44
Required to pass 320
MEPs Percent
For 487 71%
Against 152 22%
Abstentions 46 7%
Table 6: Group cohesion in the vote
Group MEPs Absent Non-voters Present For Against Abstentions Cohesion General cohesion
EPP 269 13 6 250 220 20 10 82.0 95.4
S&D 189 10 7 172 152 6 14 82.6 94.6
Greens/EFA 59 3 0 56 52 3 1 89.3 92.0
GUE/NGL 33 4 1 28 23 0 5 73.2 76.5
ALDE 84 3 1 80 24 54 2 51.3 91.0
ECR 53 7 4 42 1 40 1 92.9 87.8
EFD 33 2 4 27 3 14 10 27.8 43.8
NI 32 2 0 30 12 15 3 25.0
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It is clear from the figures, that although the question has been quite straightforward to 
groups whose ideology the Financial Transaction Tax suits well, such as the supporting 
Greens/EFA and leftist GUE/NGL or opposing conservative ECR, the two largest groups - 
the centre-right EPP and centre-left S&D - have not been able to whip their MEPs to reach a 
cohesion normally achieved in economic and monetary affairs. Interestingly still, the liberal 
ALDE, set out to oppose the proposal, saw a dramatic loss of cohesion from the standard 
level of 91 points to a mere 51 points. A similar loss can also be seen in the group of the 
Eurosceptic EFD, from the general level of 43 points to almost 28 points - caused by a 
notable abstention of almost 40 % of the voting MEPs. These figures clearly indicate of the 
controversial internal nature of the proposal for a majority of the groups.  
To emphasise the cohesion rates a bit further, Table 7 presents the average of group 
cohesions in the case of the FTT separated first into supporter and opponent cohesion and 
then total group cohesion. As a comparison, the general group cohesion on economic and 
monetary questions is presented in the bottom row (VoteWatch Europe 2014b). 
 
 
Source: VoteWatch Europe 2014a  
The Table shows that the supporters of the tax were more capable of whipping their 
representatives into toeing the group line than the opponents with a difference of nearly 25 
points. The overall group cohesion is also over ten points smaller than normally in the area of 
economic and monetary affairs, caused almost entirely by the opponents internal dispersion 
as the cohesion between the supporters all but reaches the general levels. 
 
4.1.2 Results divided by country 
Table 8 shows the MEP’s votes divided according to the country of origin in a similar manner 
to Table 6 showing the FTT-supporting countries shaded with grey.  
Table 7: Group cohesion summary
Supporter cohesion 81.8
Opponent cohesion 57.3
Group cohesion FTT 71.3
General group cohesion 83.0
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Source: VoteWatch Europe 2014a  
The figures reveal similar patterns than when divided by political groups: some countries’ 
MEPs show highly similar voting behaviour notwithstanding the political group; in fact, all of 
the Greek (for) and Maltese (against) MEPs voted exactly the same showing a national 
cohesion rate of a hundred. Also the Austrian, French, Hungarian, Lithuanian, Portuguese 
and Spanish MEPs are quite unison in their support for the FTT. The most divided countries 
on the issue are the Czech Republic, Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and 
Sweden – all either opponents or sceptical of the tax. Some divided countries also show 
Table 8: Voting results divided by MEP's country of origin
Member State MEPs Absent Non-voters Present For Against Abstentions Cohesion %
Austria 19 1 0 18 17 1 0 91.7
Belgium 22 0 0 22 15 5 2 52.3
Bulgaria 18 1 0 17 13 4 0 64.7
Cyprus 6 0 0 6 0 4 2 50.0
Czech Republic 22 2 2 18 10 7 1 33.3
Denmark 13 0 0 13 3 6 4 19.2
Estonia 6 0 0 6 2 4 0 50.0
Finland 13 0 0 13 10 2 1 65.4
France 74 10 2 62 58 1 3 90.3
Germany 99 0 4 95 81 12 2 77.9
Greece 22 2 0 20 20 0 0 100.0
Hungary 21 2 0 19 18 1 0 92.1
Ireland 12 2 0 10 4 2 4 10.0
Italy 73 5 1 67 57 1 9 77.6
Latvia 9 1 0 8 2 5 1 43.8
Lithuania 12 1 0 11 10 1 0 86.4
Luxembourg 6 0 0 6 3 1 2 25.0
Malta 6 1 0 5 0 5 0 100.0
Netherlands 26 1 0 25 12 13 0 28.0
Poland 51 5 3 43 32 10 1 61.6
Portugal 22 0 3 19 17 1 1 84.2
Romania 33 4 1 28 23 5 0 73.2
Slovakia 13 0 0 13 8 4 1 42.3
Slovenia 8 0 0 8 5 3 0 43.8
Spain 54 2 1 51 50 0 1 97.1
Sweden 20 0 2 18 10 8 0 33.3
United Kingdom 72 4 4 64 7 46 11 57.8
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relative high percentages of abstentions, possibly indicating of unwillingness to vote against 
the political group line as noted in the group cohesion rates in the previous chapter. The 
aggregate cohesion rate for the supporting countries amounts to 73.4 whereas the opposing or 
neutral countries’ average cohesion rate is 52.7, showing greater internal division. However, 
a large portion of the Member States are somewhere between these two ends. 13 Member 
States, including the United Kingdom, Germany and Italy, have their cohesion rates between 
forty and eighty points. 
When these figures are inserted into the speculative Table 2 shown previously, an interesting 
pattern emerges in Table 9. The supporting countries are once again shaded with a grey 
undertone. It needs to be pointed out, that the level of cohesion does not correlate positively 
with support for the FTT so that high cohesion rates equal support for the proposal. The 
cohesion rate indicates just the internal voting behaviour uniformity of the MEPs from the 
Member States or political groups as in the previous chapter.  
 
 
Table 9: Country cohesion rates inserted into Table 2
France 90.3 Bulgaria 64.7 Austria 91.7
Germany 77.9 Cyprus 50 Belgium 52.3
Italy 77.6 The Czech Republic 33.3 Estonia 50
Slovenia 43.8 Denmark 19.2 Finland 65.4
Spain 97.1 Luxembourg 25 Greece 100
Malta 100 Hungary 92.1
Sweden 33.3 Ireland 10
United Kingdom 57.8 Latvia 43.8
Lithuania 86.4
The Netherlands 28
Poland 61.6
Portugal 84.2
Romania 73.2
Slovakia 42.3
Total cohesion 77.3 Total cohesion 47.9 Total cohesion 62.9
Internal division 
- Strong Euroscepticism or 
lukewarm stance of the MS 
Difficult to approve 
- MS opposition
Easy to approve
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Taking into consideration that the two largest groups, EPP and S&D, have between them 458 
MEPs out of a total number of 752 MEPs spanning into every Member State apart from one 
(the EPP does not have representation in the United Kingdom as the British Conservatives 
left the Group to form the ECR (European Parliament 2014c)) and that they were heavily for 
the initiative, the political system and situation in the Member State clearly has an effect in 
addition to the political group in the Parliament. All of the countries grouped under the so-
called Europhile political system are also supporters of the proposed FTT with an aggregate 
cohesion rate of just under 80 points. Apart from Slovenia, the cohesion rates are very high, 
ranging from 77 to 97 points. The benign national stance towards the Union makes it easy for 
its MEPs to support the legislative proposal and the cohesion of the supporters is highest of 
the three groupings.  
The MEPs from countries opposing the FTT show a lower cohesion rate of a little less than 
50 points. Apart from the totally unison refusal by the Maltese, the MEPs voting behaviour 
varies from majority against (Cyprus, Denmark and the United Kingdom), almost 50-50 
situations (the Czech Republic and Sweden) to countries where a clear majority of the MEPs 
has voted for the proposal despite Member State opposition (Bulgaria, Luxembourg). 33 % of 
Cypriot MEPs abstained while the rest voted against, whereas when 33% of the 
Luxembourgian MEPs abstained, almost all of the rest voted for the proposal. Also a notable 
portion, 22 %, of the British MEPs either didn’t vote or abstained. 
The third group with either a strong Eurosceptic element in their political system or a 
lukewarm national stance towards the FTT appear to be a very motley crowd. Ranging from 
the internal cohesion rate of 10 in Ireland to 100 in Greece, the aggregate cohesion rate of the 
group is a bit over 60 points. MEPs from only three out of the 14 Member States voted with a 
majority against the proposal (Estonia, Latvia and the Netherlands), the other MEPs showed 
support for the proposal by mainly voting along their political group lines. Interestingly 
although Estonia as a country decided to move forward with the enhanced cooperation 
umbrella of the FTT, 66 % of its MEPs were against the proposal. Also out of the 10 Irish 
MEPs present, 40 % chose to abstain from the vote. 
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4.1.3 A closer look into some of the Member States 
Some of these Member State vote apportionments are now looked more closely, especially in 
the case of the countries with low or medium cohesion to see whether distinct voting patterns 
have emerged. It is interesting to see the interplay between national and political group 
pressures - and which has prevailed. Tables 10 to 17 show cases of different MEP voting 
behaviour divided by Member States. The tables have been simplified according to the group 
voting instructions and whether the MEP was loyal or rebel to one’s political group. 
Abstentions, non-voters and absent shares are also visible, all followed by political group of 
the MEPs in the shares. In addition to showing the number of MEPs in each voting category, 
the numbers are also transformed into percentages to show the voters share of the total 
numbers of MEPs from each country. The percentages of the vote shares have been rounded 
into full numbers, so the Tables with an asterisque do not match to a hundred. All of the 
statistics are based on data from the VoteWatch Europe FTT vote (2014a). 
 
The MEPs from Estonia, although few in numbers, were clearly against the proposal with 
two thirds voting against the FTT despite the national stance of approval for the proposal. 
Half of the Estonian MEPs are Members of ALDE and voted according to group line, thus 
against the proposal. One Estonian EPP MEP also voted against the proposal, against his 
group instructions. The Socialist and Greens/EFA MEPs voted according to group and 
Member State opinions and for the proposal.  
 
Table 10: Estonian MEPs, Member State FOR
Vote 6 MEPs Groups
Against - loyal 3 (50 %) ALDE
Against - rebel 1 (17 %) EPP
For - loyal 2 (33 %) Greens/EFA, S&D 
Table 11: Irish MEPs, Member State NO OPINION 
Vote 12 MEPs Groups
Against - loyal 2 (17 %) ALDE
For - loyal 2 (17 %) S&D 
For - rebel 1 (8 %) ALDE
For - NI 1 (8 %)
Abstention 5 (42 %) ALDE, EPP
Absent 1 (8 %) GUE/NGL
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Ireland is a country that has officially been neutral towards the FTT but naturally follows the 
United Kingdom closely in its movements. The strong divisive pressure from the Member 
State is quite visible when half of the MEPs were either absent or decided to abstention in the 
vote. The MEPs who chose to vote did so mainly according to group line, whether for or 
against the proposal, with one defector from the ALDE group line of voting against the FTT.  
 
Italy is one of the original six Member States of the European Union and it has been a 
proponent of integration ever since. The strong national stance and the dominance of the 
major political groups are visible in the Italian delegation with only one EFD MEP voting 
against the proposal. Out of five ALDE Members, three chose to vote against their group line 
and two were absent. However, noteworthy is the large amount of abstentions, consisting 
mainly of representatives of the EFD that would have voted against the proposal if following 
the group recommendations. 
 
Table 12: Italian MEPs, Member State FOR*
Vote 73 MEPs Groups
Against - loyal 1 (1 %) EFD
For - loyal 54 (74 %) EPP, S&D
For - rebel 3 (4 %) ALDE 
Abstention 9 (12 %) EFD, EPP
Didn't vote 1 (1 %) EFD
Absent 5 (7 %) ALDE, EPP
Table 13: Polish MEPs, Member State NO OPINION*
Vote 51 MEPs Groups
Against - loyal 9 (18 %) ECR, EFD
Against - rebel 1 (2 %) EPP
For - loyal 31 (61 %) EPP, S&D
For - rebel 1 (2 %) ECR
Abstention 1 (2 %) EFD
Didn't vote 3 (6 %) ECR, EFD
Absent 5 (10 %) ECR, EPP
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The tables from Polish and Romanian MEPs votes are examined together as they show a very 
similar pattern. Without a strong Member State stance on the tax, the MEPs mainly adhere to 
group voting recommendations with almost 80 % in both countries and only few percentages 
of rebels. With approximately ten percent absent from the vote, the Polish EFD and ECR 
MEPs were somewhat more inclined to abstain or refrain from the vote completely compared 
to the one Romanian ALDE MEP that didn’t vote. 
 
The Spanish delegation is chosen as an example of a large enthusiastically pro-FTT Member 
State. None of the Spanish MEPs voted against the proposal and only four percent of the 
representatives either didn’t vote or chose to abstention from the vote, representing 
interestingly the leftist political groups. 
 
Table 14: Romanian MEPs, Member State NO OPINION
Vote 33 MEPs Groups
Against - loyal 4 (12 %) ALDE
Against - rebel 1 (3 %) EPP
For - loyal 21 (64 %) EPP, S&D
For - NI 2 (6 %)
Didn't vote 1 (3 %) ALDE
Absent 4 (12 %) EPP, S&D, NI
Table 15: Spanish MEPs, Member State FOR*
Vote 54 MEPs Groups
For - loyal 47 (87 %) EPP, Greens/EFA, S&D
For - rebel 2 (4 %) ALDE
For - NI 1 (2 %)
Abstention 1 (2 %) GUE/NGL
Didn't vote 1 (2 %) S&D
Absent 2 (4 %) EPP, S&D
Table 16: Swedish MEPs, Member State AGAINST
Vote 20 MEPs Groups
Against - loyal 4 (20 %) ALDE
Against - rebel 4 (20 %) EPP
For - loyal 10 (50 %) Greens/EFA, GUE/NGL, S&D
Didn't vote 2 (10 %) EPP, S&D
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Sweden was one of the strongest critics of the FTT proposal and it can be seen in the figures 
from the MEP delegation. Illustrating a somewhat clear divide between Hooghe and Marks’ 
regulated capitalism vs. neoliberalism, the ALDE and EPP representatives voted against the 
proposal notwithstanding their group line; and the leftist S&D, Greens/EFA and GUE/NGL 
MEPs voted for the proposal despite their Member State opposition. One EPP and S&D MEP 
chose not to vote, whether due to Member State or group pressures, remains to be speculated. 
 
Finally, the delegation from the United Kingdom, offers interesting variety in the MEP’s 
voting decisions. The strong Member State opposition shows in that only 9 % of the MEPs, 
mainly from the Greens/EFA and S&D groups, voted for the proposal. What is even more 
significant is the very high amount of abstentions or non-voters, at slightly over 20 %. The 
pro-FTT S&D group had 13 MEPs from Britain and out of them ten chose to abstain or 
refrain from the vote whereas the rest voted for the proposal. The Greens/EFA delegation was 
also split in half for and against the proposal. Clearly, in the case of the United Kingdom, the 
national pressure had a significant impact over group recommendations. 
 
  
Table 17: British MEPs, Member State AGAINST
Vote 72 MEPs Groups
Against - loyal 37 (51 %) ALDE, ECR, EFD
Against - rebel 2 (3 %) Greens/EFA
Against - NI 7 (10 %)
For - loyal 6 (8 %) Greens/EFA, S&D
For - rebel 1 (1 %) ALDE
Abstention 11 (15 %) ALDE, ECR, Greens/EFA, S&D
Didn't vote 4 (6 %) ECR, EFD, S&D
Absent 4 (6 %) ECR, EFD
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4.2 REFLECTIONS FROM THE VOTING RESULTS 
Based on the tables presented in the previous chapter 4.1, a few remarks can be made. As 
presumed, the delegations from countries with Europhile political systems and support for the 
tax are more unified in their support for the proposal across political group lines. With a 
notable exception in Estonia and their MEP’s majority voting against the FTT, the 
representatives have mainly either voted for the tax or refrained from voting against it. In the 
countries where the FTT was strongly a negative issue, the MEPs are more prone to vote 
according to Member State opinions, despite political group pressures from the Parliament. 
Supporting Table 9, the MEPs from these Member States clearly do not find the question of 
the FTT that easy to accept. The countries with a more neutral stance towards the proposal 
show a higher adherence to group recommendations with the exception of Ireland. With half 
of its MEPs either absent or refraining from the vote, the actual votes were cast mainly 
according to group recommendations. Besides national opposition or support to the proposal, 
no strong regional blocks emerge from the Member States apart from the crisis-stricken large 
Southern European countries, which are for the proposal.  
The statistics from the Tables above lead to conclude that it is easier for the leftist parties to 
accept the proposal for more financial regulation; whereas the more right-wing politicians 
show more hesitation in the form of voting against, abstaining or non-voting. However, to 
receive the full picture of the MEP’s voting behaviour, the loyalty to political groups needs to 
be addressed. Table 18 shows the representatives loyalty to their political groups, once again 
the proponents of the FTT are shaded in grey. The shares of MEPs are also shown in 
percentage values, although the percentages of absent and non-voting MEPs are in relation to 
the total amount of MEPs and the loyal/rebel percentages are in relation to the MEPs active in 
the vote including votes for, against and abstentions.  
 
Table 18: MEP loyalty to political groups
Group MEPs
EPP 269 13 5% 6 2% 250 93% 220 88% 30 12%
S&D 189 10 5% 7 4% 172 91% 152 88% 20 12%
Greens/EFA 59 3 5% 0 0% 56 95% 52 93% 4 7%
GUE/NGL 33 4 12% 1 3% 28 85% 23 82% 5 18%
ALDE 84 3 4% 1 1% 80 95% 54 68% 26 33%
ECR 53 7 13% 4 8% 42 79% 40 95% 2 5%
EFD 33 2 6% 4 12% 27 82% 14 52% 13 48%
Absent Non-voters Present Loyal Rebel
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Source: VoteWatch Europe 2014a  
 
Although the country by country statistics presented previously show that applying the 
theoretical framework of regulated capitalism vs. neoliberalism might be explanatory in the 
voting results, as the right-leaning MEPs seem to be more prone to refrain from voting in an 
ideologically sensitive issue of economic integration and the left-leaning politicians are more 
willing to even brake Member State opinions for ideological reasons, the large-scale voting 
figures reveal that there are no major differences in the voting behaviour of the two largest 
groups; the centre-right EPP and centre-left S&D. This may lead to several conclusions: 
maybe the two primus motors of European integration are too close to each other 
ideologically to be regarded as “the right” or “left” according to the theoretical meaning of 
political ideology. Or perhaps even though the two largest groups have needed to grow in size 
to remain in power, thus losing in internal cohesion, they still remain quite unified in regards 
to European integration. 
Possibly the left and right end of the political spectrum need to be expanded further away 
from the mid-field of politics – e.g. into clearly conservative and integration-sceptic ECR on 
the right and the clearly leftist GUE/NGL on the left. Although the ECR is staunchly unison 
in its objection to the FTT, the GUE/NGL MEPs show some hesitations when five of its 
representatives abstained from the vote and can be regarded as rebels. The abstentions of two 
Cypriot MEPs were clearly due to the national position on the tax, but the others came from 
Spain and Germany – Member States strongly for the tax. 
The theoretical framework of Hooghe and Marks’s GAL (green/alternative/libertarian) – 
TAN (traditional/authoritarian/nationalist) proves to be usable in regards to the Greens/EFA 
and ECR representative’s voting behaviour. The smaller political groups appear more 
homogenous on the issue, despite Member State opinion, with a clear ideological position on 
the tax - whether for or against. The exception can be found with the diffuse group of the 
Eurosceptic EFD, where a large Italian delegation abstained from the vote and some 
individual representatives from Member States supporting the tax chose to vote for the 
proposal. The EFD emphasises the lack of group discipline when voting, which also explains 
for the easier defection from the group voting lines. 
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What is noteworthy in the figures is the large amount of rebel voters within the ALDE group, 
which - in line with previous theoretical literature - decided to oppose increasing financial 
regulation. The rebel voters were mainly from countries supporting the FTT, but also three 
British ALDE MEPs either abstained or voted for the proposal. This could be explained by 
the fact that as British Conservatives separated from the EPP to form the more critical ECR, 
some of the more pro-European Conservatives joined the Liberal Democrats in ALDE. 
To sum up, national pressures are clearly strongest when the Member State is opposed to the 
proposal but also when the national opinion is strongly for the tax. When countries have a 
lukewarm attitude towards the initiative, the importance of the political group increases and 
voting occurs mainly according to political groups. The two main groups are fairly cohesive 
on the FTT, which can also be derived from the importance of integration in their political 
ideology and agenda. Even stronger unity is visible in smaller and more homogenous groups 
with a pronounced ideological take on the legislative proposal.  
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4.3 DISCOURSES FROM THE PLENARY 
4.3.1 General notions 
The discussions in the European Parliament’s plenary session are held in two separate parts. 
First there is a debate, usually a full debate such as in the case of the FTT, which normally 
follows the subsequent speaking order: the Rapporteur or the MEP responsible for the 
proposal (European Parliament 2006); the Council representative, often from the country 
holding the Precidency; the Commission representative, often the Commissioner; 
Rapporteurs of opinions from involved Committees; Group speeches and finally MEPs 
asking to address the plenary (European Parliament 2014d, 12). The second part consists of 
explanation of votes given either orally or in writing after the votes (ibid., 26). Whereas the 
individual addresses in the plenary remind of Pekonen’s “talking to the record” (2011, 111), 
the actual political debate in the plenary happens in the debate phase before the vote in the 
form of blue-card questions where the MEPs are entitled to ask the current speaker up to a 
thirty second question and if the speaker accepts the blue-card question, the MEP is expected 
to answer it in thirty seconds time (European Parliament 2014d, 14). The significance of the 
FTT as a political question is clear as day from the actual amount of speeches held by the 
MEPs as well as the number of blue-card questions. The president actually had to stop 
allowing the blue-card questions so that the debate was kept in its time frame (European 
Parliament 2012a). 
The presentation of the political discourses advances through the thematic entities discovered 
during the analysis of the narratives: the financial crisis and European economy, the role of 
the banks and the citizens, the economic justifications for or against the FTT and the interplay 
between national and European emphasis. These topics emerged from the analysis as the 
central encompassing themes for the debate, covering all of the individual statements and 
claims for or against the tax. Theories of politicisation emphasise the ‘how’ of bringing forth 
issue salience. This thesis is interested in the priming, framing and cueing (Hooghe & Marks 
2009) of discourses and especially the framing – or connecting the question to a larger 
political debate and targets. The themes arising from the debate can be seen to fall under 
three frames: a normative frame relating to the financial crisis - where the financial sector is 
made the guilty party and the people depicted as victims; a functional frame with ‘rational’ 
economic arguments and an authoritarian frame of the power struggle between the national 
and supranational levels. The chapter focuses on presenting these themes through the 
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speeches of the representatives and the following chapter 4.4 connects the debate into the 
wider theoretical framework.  
Before embarking on analysing the actual speeches by the MEPs, it is worthwhile to take a 
look at some statistics in the background of the analysis; specifically how the addresses were 
divided between political groups and what are the shares of the voting decisions behind these 
speeches and whether they differ from the general group voting decisions. Once again, the 
voting statistics from each individual MEP are retrieved from VoteWatch Europe (2014a). 
 
 
When comparing the amounts of held speeches compared to the number of MEPs in each 
group in Table 19, a majority of the groups’ Members addressed the plenary in line with the 
overall shares of the MEPs. However, some groups stand out as distinctly passive or active in 
the discussions. Even though the Greens/EFA groups was almost uniform in their defence of 
the FTT proposal, the group’s representatives were markedly quiet in the plenary compared 
to the general average. Then again, Members from GUE/NGL and EFD groups were more 
active in the debate, especially Members of the EFD group in the debate before the vote. The 
shares of the largest groups are roughly in line with the averages as well as the Members 
from ECR group. The non-attached MEPs were slightly more active in the plenary than in the 
actual explanation of votes. 
Table 19: MEP speeches on the FTT in the plenary May 23rd 2012
Group MEPs Speeches
Individual MEPs 
(% of total MEPs) Speeches
Individual MEPs 
(% of total MEPs)
EPP 269 15 12 (4 %) 47 47 (17 %)
S&D 189 17 14 (7 %) 27 32 (17 %)
ALDE 84 8 6 (7 %) 15 16 (19 %)
Greens/EFA 59 3 3 (5 %) 3 3 (5 %)
ECR 53 11 5 (9 %) 7 7 (13 %)
GUE/NGL 33 4 3 (9 %) 11 11 (33 %)
EFD 33 8 4 (12 %) 7 7 (21 %)
NI 32 5 4 (13 %) 5 5 (16 %)
Total 752 71 51 (7 %) 122 128 (17 %)
Explanation of votesDebate speeches
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Table 20 illustrates how the addressing MEPs voted inside each group. The asterisque 
marked political groups’ total percentages do not add up to a hundred percent due to rounding 
up of the numbers. In the EPP and S&D groups the rebel share of MEPs is 12 % while the 
MEPs taking part in the discussion include vast larger shares of rebels. Also 33 % of ALDE 
MEPs voted against group instructions whereas almost half of the addresses came from 
MEPs diverging from the group line. Interestingly the share of loyal voters within the EFD 
group is overemphasised contrary to the other groups where rebel votes are more pronounced 
in the speeches. The shares from GUE/NGL, the Greens/EFA and ECR roughly equal that of 
the voting patterns. The overemphasis of the rebels in the speeches suggests of the 
importance of justifying one’s actions against the group line. This might be an indicator of 
adhering to an internal logic of appropriateness and when breaking the group 
recommendations, also explicating it to the colleagues in addition to the public. 
All of the speeches in the following chapters are derived from two websites, the plenary 
debate (European Parliament 2012a) and the explanation of votes (European Parliament 
2012b). To increase traceability and transparency, the references are coded in the discourse 
analysis as follows: 2012a (debate) or 2012b (explanation of votes) political group MEP 
surname. This enables for the individual addresses to be found more easily as the addresses 
on the website proceed chronologically according to each individual speech held by the 
MEPs while not being overcome with endless repetition.  
 
 
Table 20: The shares of MEP speeches according to vote
Group
Individual MEP 
opinions
EPP* 59 44 75% 8 14% 7 12%
S&D* 44 35 80% 4 9% 3 7% 2 5%
ALDE 21 10 48% 11 52%
Greens/EFA 6 6 100%
ECR 12 12 100%
GUE/NGL 13 10 77% 3 23%
EFD 10 1 10% 6 60% 2 20% 1 10%
NI* 8 4 50% 3 38% 1 13%
Total 173 110 64% 44 25% 16 9% 3 2%
For Against Abstention Didn't vote
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4.3.2 It’s the economy, stupid! 
4.3.2.1 The financial crisis 
The backdrop of the debate on the financial transaction tax is clearly in the financial crisis. 
Starting with the financial sector and rapidly spreading to the real economy - generally 
meaning the production of goods and services - the deep recession and impacts on 
employment and the Member States were strongly felt all over Europe (e.g. European 
Parliament 2012b EFD Imbrasas). The crisis is even depicted as hanging over the Union as 
‘the sword of Damocles’ and that the EU has lacked the ‘courage and determination’ to 
prevent the financial crisis from becoming a social crisis (2012b S&D Smolková). The 
Member States’ economies are described as ‘paralysed and incapable of combating the social 
and economic challenges’ (2012b EPP Ronzulli). Some see the reason behind the crisis in the 
inflexible common currency leading ‘young people to the hopelessness of unemployment 
and… democratic deficit’; even towards political extremes (2012a NI Dodds). The harsh 
austerity measures implemented in the Member States to tackle the crisis are clear, especially 
in the Southern Member State MEPs make statements under the normative frame and largely 
for the proposal. An Italian EPP Member points out economic implications to financing 
sovereign debt and the increases in interests and costs for countries with especially high 
public debt (2012a Pallone). One Greens/EFA MEP (2012a Durant) speaks for the FTT and 
the usage of its revenues in recovery projects to escape austerity, that she sees leading to 
exasperation and dead-end political situations.  
The financial crisis is also present in the way how Member States and the EU have been 
focusing on expenditures whereas now they could pay more attention to the receipts coming 
into the coffers (2012a ALDE Goulard). The narrative of growth and jobs is a recurring 
theme when searching for solutions to escape the financial crisis. The FTT is portrayed by 
many as the key to this dilemma and the ideological undertones regarding financial regulation 
and its effects on the economy are clear in the speeches. The S&D claims that the FTT is ‘an 
integral part of Europe’s strategy to exit the crisis’, estimating to increase the EU GDP by 
0,25 % (2012a Podimata, 2012b Costello). The possibility of using the revenue to stimulate 
growth, job creation, fiscal consolidation, development goals and the fight against climate 
change is visible in the speeches of the group Members (ibid.). Many leftist MEPs (e.g. 
2012a The Greens/EFA Turunen) refute the claims that the FTT would be detrimental for 
growth and jobs – instead they call support from a Commission calculation suggesting that 
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using the revenue for investments could boost the economy up to a half a percentage. This 
shows elements from the regulated capitalism debate in the theoretical literature. The 
harmonisation and elimination of double taxation is presented as a way for the internal 
market to grow even by some right-wing politicians (2012b EPP Cancian) and an abstained 
non-attached Member (2012b Gollnisch) asked could the effects of the FTT on the economy 
be any ‘worse than today?’. 
The tones from the ‘neoliberal’ side of the divide are clear as well: the centre politicians are 
more sceptical about the proposal and sure it will hamper growth (2012a ALDE Haglund). In 
the explanation of votes one ALDE representative (2012b Rohde) turns the setting into one of 
Europe first suffering from the severe economic crisis and now it has been made worse and 
the ‘Robin Hood tax’ is even portrayed as a ‘Sheriff of Nottingham tax’ - turning on the real 
economy (2012b ALDE Lyon). For many right-wing politicians it is ‘almost beyond 
comprehension’ that the FTT could be seen as a stimulus for growth (2012a NI Dodds). The 
method of implementation and the effectiveness of the measures raise concern (2012b EFD 
Morganti) or simply the aim of the proposal as regulation is not seen as the correct path 
(2012a EPP Feio), turning right-wing MEPs voting decisions into abstentions. The ECR 
refers to economic history providing no examples of taxes boosting growth (2012a ECR 
Strejček). The tax is shown to cost jobs and growth on top of already implemented austerity 
measures (2012b EFD Belder) and making citizens believe otherwise is presented as 
‘untruthful’ (2012a ECR Swinburne). Taxes are portrayed as killing competitiveness, 
reducing liquidity and access to credit, necessary for the citizens as well as business (2012a 
ECR Szymański, 2012b EFD Morganti). The threats of slower growth and restrictions on 
investments are portrayed as consequences of the introduction of the tax (2012a ECR 
Strejček.) and even the dissident voices within EPP claim that it will only worsen the 
‘enormous’ economic problems, strain the economy and lead to less growth (2012a Hökmark, 
2012b Jordan, Kariņš). 
4.3.2.2 The financial markets vs. the real economy 
The juxtapositioning of the financial markets and the ‘real economy’ is clearly visible in the 
speeches and it is an efficient rhetoric argument combining the normative and functional 
frames. Whether snide remarks of the low proposed tax rate for transactions in comparison to 
the taxes in other sections of the economy (2012b EPP Jahr), making the financial sector a 
part of the real economy (2012b EPP Dati) or shifting the ‘significant negative externalities’ 
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from the real economy (2012b EPP Mathieu), the financial sector provides an easy target for 
the MEPs. The principal ‘virtue’ of the FTT is seen in the ‘political signal’ it sends to the 
financial sector which is both lightly taxed compared to ‘genuine productive activities’ as 
well as unsatisfactory in funding the economy (2012a GUE/NGL Klute, 2012b NI Gollnisch). 
Even though admitting that new taxes may not solve ‘our’ problems they might, however, 
lead to a tax reduction in other sectors (2012b EPP Antoniozzi). However, the proposal is 
also criticised for its purely symbolic goals: although pleasing the electorates the FTT will 
have negative overall effects on Europe (2012a ALDE Haglund). 
The economic arguments are used widely also under the normative frame. The word 
speculative penetrates all levels of discussion in a highly negative tone. Short-term 
transactions and speculative trade, producing no added value, are shown to be opposed to the 
real economy, from which the financial sector is often portrayed as being detached (2012b NI 
Mölzer, Obermayr). Providing a disincentive for excessively risky activities with the tax is an 
important feature in the speeches (2012b ALDE Harkin, 2012b EFD Imbrasas, 2012b 
GUE/NGL Ferreira, 2012b S&D Paleckis). The aiding of real economy, families and 
businesses, instead of the speculative finance sector is even portrayed as ‘ethical and moral’ 
(2012a EFD Morganti). It is doubtful whether the word ‘speculative’ could even be used in a 
positive light and many finance economists use the term ‘market making’ to describe short-
term trade – a term which is clearly absent in the plenary debate. Some MEPs present clear 
statements of the financial beneficiality of the FTT and that it would bring more certainty to 
the investors via increasing the financial sector’s stability and resilience (2012b S&D Enciu) 
or even prevent the collapse of the internal financial transaction markets (2012b S&D 
Flašíková Beňová). Then again, the tax is also portrayed to muddle the distinction between 
speculators and people investing for their future (2012a ECR Swinburne).  
 
4.3.3 The victims and the guilty party 
4.3.3.1 It were the bankers who did it 
No matter from which political group the MEP comes from, the banking sector is held 
responsible for the financial crisis and it provides an easy target for blame under the 
normative frame. Globalisation is shown to have brought disproportionate growth in the 
financial sector and combined with non-transparent and frequent transactions with high pay 
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and ‘very high risk’, they have contributed fundamentally to the financial crisis (2012a S&D 
Ferreira). The deregulation of the financial market is seen as the root cause behind the crisis 
(2012a S&D Guerrero Salom). The banks are even portrayed with heavy images such as 
‘crooked, money-printing, criminal behaviour’ (2012a EFD Bloom) or avid predators (2012a 
GUE/NGL Omarjee). The speculators and big stock market players are described as ‘placing 
their bets’ on the crisis (2012b S&D Liberadzki). Some of the speeches even mention 
financial lobbies and how they have been ‘successful in ruling the world’ (2012a GUE/NGL 
Matias) and hope that they do not influence the decisions of the MEPs in this debate (2012b 
NI Obermayr).  
What is often presented in the discourse is the way how the citizen’s and taxpayers’ money 
has been used to bail out the banks, while the banking sector has not contributed to the 
financing of the crisis measures – now solidarity is called from the banks to the citizens (e.g. 
2012b Greens/EFA Häfner, 2012b NI Mölzer, Obermayr). In a very similar tone to the 
Commission arguments the banking sector is portrayed as the root cause of the financial 
crisis, making it simply ‘fair’ for the financial sector to be taxed (2012a Greens/EFA Durant, 
2012a S&D Podimata, 2012b ALDE Harkin, 2012b EFD Imbrasas, 2012b EPP Jahr). The 
GUE Group address (2012a Matias) even mentions it to be the first clear signal that the banks 
were being made responsible for their actions. Even the rightist MEPs see that the financial 
sector ‘must bear its part’ in debt reduction and supporting growth (2012a NI Dodds). The 
states are portrayed as having to intervene in the private sector to ‘resolve critical situations’ 
caused by ‘unbridled’ speculation and ‘lack of supervision’ (2012a EPP Pallone). If the main 
justifications for the need of the tax are in the financial crisis, it is clear where the fingers 
point unanimously in search for the guilty party.   
4.3.3.2 Advocates of the people 
If the banks are the guilty party, the citizens are the victims of the financial crisis. People are 
presented as the sufferers whereas the bankers and financial markets have passed through the 
crisis unscathed (e.g. 2012b 2012b EPP Mann, Greens/EFA Häfner). The FTT does not 
simply send a message to the financial sector - it is portrayed as conveying a message to the 
public as well (2012a GUE/NGL Klute). Many MEPs, especially on the left, bring out the 
notion that the majority of the Europeans support the FTT initiative, most likely based on the 
Eurobarometer poll that 66 % of citizens support the idea of a European transaction tax 
(2012a GUE/NGL Klute, 2012b Greens/EFA Häfner). Taxpayers are pictured as bailing out 
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the banks – the citizens deserve better, having paid for everything (2012a GUE/NGL Matias , 
2012b EPP Delvaux).  
The impacts and justifications for the FTT are often fetched from the everyday implications 
to the people. The debated austerity policies are portrayed as having a hard impact on the 
citizens, driving them into poverty and leading to political and democratic stalemate (2012b 
Greens/EFA Grèze). MEPs from especially the crisis countries (2012b EPP Antoniozzi, 
Zanicchi) describe the increased taxes and ‘severe cuts’ in wages and pensions as the cost 
from the crisis seen ‘in the streets of our cities’. The redevelopment of the financial sector is 
portrayed to have drained money from public funds that could have otherwise used in 
education and health of the citizens (2012b S&D Smolková) and the FTT is portrayed as 
removing the financial institution’s exemption from taxes and making the banks pay as the 
citizens do ‘on bread and petrol on a daily basis’, creating more ‘solidarity’ in the world 
(2012b ALDE Uggias).  
Democracy, justice and solidarity are recurring themes especially in the leftist speeches. The 
Parliament and the EU institutions should be ‘responsible for people, not the financial 
markets’ and the FTT is portrayed as reasserting the ‘supremacy of democratic politics’ over 
the financial markets (2012a GUE Matias, 2012b ALDE Uggias). One Greens/EFA MEP 
(2012b Häfner) even claims that the democratic institutions and procedures need to be 
rethought and changed so that the financial sector can be harnessed to serve the real economy 
and the people – rather than “destroying society, markets, the real economy and social 
cohesion in Europe at a dramatic rate and with increasingly visible fatal consequences”. 
Earmarking part the revenue for solidarity and the aim of eradicating poverty throughout the 
world is also brought forward as a justification for the tax (2012a S&D Cortés Lastra, 
Guerrero Salom). Even some EPP MEPs call for ‘greater convergence, solidarity and 
responsibility to combat the crisis’ (2012b Fidanza) or describe the FTT as essential for the 
establishment of a new fairer and more balanced political order (2012b EPP Grossetête).  
Even though the citizen’s anger towards the banks is shown as legitimate, especially the pro-
market opponents of the FTT frame the tax as not the right response as it risks increasing 
their bank charges and damaging investment, growth and jobs (2012a ALDE Schmidt, 2012b 
ALDE Callagher). Whereas many leftist MEPs often present the citizens as victims of the 
financial crisis, rectified with the FTT; more right-wing politicians present the citizens as the 
victims of the planned FTT (2012b ECR Bielan, 2012b NI Stadler). The already suffering 
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citizens may have to carry the risk of the costs to the tax as it is not the banks but the 
customers who will ‘pick up the tab’ instead of the ‘greedy fat-cat bankers’ (2012a EFD 
Bloom, 2012b EFD Fontana). Vivid examples of costs are portrayed by the MEPs with 
concrete examples from mortgage rates to pensions (2012a ECR Swinburne). The growth in 
banking services for the citizens is even portrayed as ‘provoking an anti-EU backlash’ (2012a 
ECR Češková).  
Although the EPP MEPs voice their concerns that the end users should not be affected by the 
FTT (2012a Stolojan), they also refer to the ‘illusion’ that the FTT would not add tax burden 
on the citizens; the burden will be borne by customers - ‘all of us’ - not the anonymous 
markets (2012a Hökmark, Langen). Economic rationality seeps through from right-wing 
arguments against the tax. Even though many especially leftist MEPs claim that the pension 
savers would not have been affected by the inclusion of the pension funds as the ‘progressive 
nature’ of the FTT is described as having an impact on most active traders (2012a 
Greens/EFA Turunen, 2012a NI Martin, 2012a S&D Domenici, 2012b Grèze), the more 
right-wing MEPs were pleased for the exemption of the pensions from the scope of the FTT 
(2012b EPP Gáll-Pelcz). The risk of the end costs being borne by the citizens instead of the 
financial sector influenced the voting decisions ending also in abstentions (2012a EPP Feio, 
2012b EFD Fontana). 
 
4.3.4 Economic undertones 
4.3.4.1 From global forerunners to fears of reallocation 
The functional frame with ‘rational’ and ‘neutral’ economic arguments focuses on the 
effectiveness and nature of the FTT instead of inserting ideological arguments as the main 
thrust of the discussion. The effectiveness of the financial transaction tax is seen greatest in a 
global form, spanned via international agreements (2012b ECR Tannock, 2012b NI Mölzer). 
Grounding on economic arguments instead of ideological affiliation, many right-wing MEPs 
are against the FTT due to its too narrow application even in an EU-wide form. Many 
representatives warn that without a global commitment, the financial sector will move away 
from Europe, which will be detrimental to the continent (2012a EFD Andreasen). Many 
Members abstained due to the failure in including all of the Member States in its scope 
(2012a EPP Feio, 2012b NI Gollnisch), some even abstained due to the lack of a global 
 70 
 
solution, seeing a European-level solution simply as detrimental to European economy 
(2012a EFD Morganti). Even though a global transaction tax is the ideal situation in many 
groups’ opinions, it is seen for Europe as the largest financial market in the world natural to 
take the first step in implementing an EU-wide FTT (2012a ALDE Klinz, 2012a EPP Pallone, 
2012a S&D Podimata, 2012b S&D Färm, Hedh, Ludvigsson, Nilsson, Ulvskog & Westlund). 
S&D MEPs (2012a Berès, Presedo, Sánchez) remind their colleagues of the commitment 
made by the G20 countries in 2009 to subject all financial institutions, markets and products 
to regulation and supervision – invoking a ‘polluter pays’ principle. The ideological tendency 
for cultural integration and global solutions is visible in especially the leftist groups’ 
narratives as predicted by theory. 
The supporters across political group divides call for as wide as possible geographical 
implementation in order for the tax to be effective. The opinion of the Internal Market and 
Consumer Protection Committee (2012a EPP Engel) calls for an EU-wide application as the 
internal market and the budget are EU-wide, not euro area wide or smaller. However, even an 
EU-wide solution is clearly seen as impossible due to disagreement between Member States 
(2012a EFD Paška). To many MEPs the failure in the wide area of implementation is the 
reason why they draw their support from the proposal. In fact, the reason for ALDE’s 
objections to the FTT are to be found in the impossibility of implementing the FTT in at least 
the whole of the 17 Euro area members despite possible ideological support (2012a Klinz, 
2012b ALDE Oviir, Thein). The group’s main argument against the FTT is the increase in 
European fragmentation, not unity and harmonisation, via the new tax - the group actually 
calls for more Europe. ALDE calls for alternatives where all countries can participate, such as 
the UK stamp duty, and then spread out to as wide as possible. The EPP opposes the stamp 
duty, once again grounded on economic arguments that a stamp duty would leave out 70 % of 
the financial markets (2012a Pietikäinen). Other alternatives for the FTT are sought in a bank 
levy or a transaction charge, even in a new ‘Glass-Steagall Act’ (2012a ECR Ford, 2012b 
ALDE Nicolai). 
The main danger in a partial or only EU-wide application of the tax is seen in the re-
allocation of business and the financial sector (2012a ECR Strejček, 2012b EFD Morganti). 
The proponents of the tax portray the tax as ‘safe’ to introduce at the EU-level or even in 
smaller groups without a ‘significant risk’ of reallocation (2012a S&D Podimata). 
Reallocation is not seen as a possibility as the costs of reallocation are presented as exceeding 
the costs of the tax (2012a ALDE Tremosa i Balcells, 2012b EPP Rivellini). The Greens/EFA 
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show examples of countries implementing a transaction tax, such as the United States or 
Switzerland, without reallocation of the finance sector (2012a, Turunen). Nonetheless, the 
limited extent of implementation and the risk of reallocation prove too large to ignore and 
cause internal division especially in the EPP (2012b Băsescu, Březina). As one EPP MEP 
claims, ‘it will be cheaper to abstain from it now, rather than to waste considerable time and 
resources only to come to the conclusion that it has proved rather inefficient lip-service to 
justice and economic revival’ (2012b Kelam). 
4.3.4.2 Rational economic arguments 
Even though one of the MEPs pleads against stirring up ‘unfounded fears’, leading to 
contradictory and counterproductive choices (2012a S&D Domenici), many of the arguments 
presented for or against the proposed FTT are founded in economic argumentation. The 
opponents of the FTT propose a variety of reasons why the FTT is ineffective as a tool. ‘No 
one’ opposes increasing effective regulation and supervision on the markets (e.g. 2012b S&D 
Olejniczak) – just that whether the FTT fulfils these criteria (2012a Haglund,  Schmidt, 2012a 
NI Stadler). The FTT is portrayed as increasing volatility on the markets, not reducing it 
(2012a ECR Strejček, 2012b EFD Bufton). The tax is presented as unable to prevent crises 
from reoccurring and instead of the FTT, tighter rules and better supervision for the financial 
sector is needed (2012b NI Stadler). Some smaller group MEPs (2012a EFD Bloom) go even 
further and attack the proponents of the FTT as providing the banks with a possibility to fail 
also in the future. Moreover, the effects of the FTT are shown to be less important than 
legislating to curb tax fraud and tax havens (2012b ALDE Harkin, Nicolai). Tax avoidance, 
either through the implementation of the FTT of otherwise is clearly brought out by ALDE 
MEPs and S&D brings forward the financial sector’s tax exile via concrete examples of 
recently uncovered cases (ibid., 2012a S&D McCarthy, 2012b ALDE Rochefort, 2012b 
GUE/NGL Zuber).  
The scope and reach of the FTT is a divisive issue among the representatives. Some wish to 
have as wide a tax base as possible to enhance its efficiency and the Parliament sought to add 
principles of issuance and ownership to minimize the avoidance of the tax (2012a 
Greens/EFA, Giegold, 2012a S&D Podimata). The opinion of the Internal Market and 
Consumer Protection Committee presented by the EPP (2012a Engel) proposes a possibility 
to separate tax levels according to the healthiness of the transactions in case, e.g. funds versus 
derivatives. The more leftist Parliamentarians wish to spread the scope of the FTT even larger 
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in the spirit of regulated capitalism: to include currency transactions, uncompleted 
transactions and pension funds (2012a Greens/EFA Giegold, 2012b Greens/EFA Grèze, 
Romeva i Rueda); one MEP called even for a supplementary tax based on the speed of the 
transaction to curb high-frequency trade (2012b GUE/NGL Gustafsson). The final vote also 
prohibited the Member States from issuing new financial transaction taxes, frowned upon by 
the GUE/NGL MEPs (2012b Mélenchon). 
The question of taxing the financial sector divides the MEPs in the discussions. Taxes are 
portrayed as ‘the price of civilisation’; ‘all those who participate in and benefit from it should 
pay those taxes’ – so the financial sector is portrayed as needing to ‘shoulder its fiscal 
responsibilities’ (2012a S&D Sànchez Presedo). The financial sectors’ exemption from 
taxation, especially value added taxes (VAT), is portrayed as ‘unfair’ resulting an uneven 
distribution of resources and even though admitting that the FTT is not a perfect solution, it is 
shown to be a viable tool to rectify this ‘undertaxation’ (2012b EPP Antoniozzi, 2012b S&D 
Färm, Hedh, Ludvigsson, Nilsson, Ulvskog & Westlund). However, interestingly a 
disagreeing Member in the S&D group noted that the FTT would simply ‘burden’ the 
financial sector with new taxes, implying that the sector was already taxed (2012b Cushieri). 
Moreover, some rightist MEPs claim that banks cannot be taxed - instead the FTT would 
affect wages, pensions and mortgages ‘for everyday workers’ (2012b EFD Bufton).  
The EPP stands out from the rest of the groups with pronounced neutral economic arguments, 
even when laying the blame for the crisis on the financial sector. This can be interpreted to be 
derived from the often very pro-market and pro-business nature of the group and their 
hesitance over directly attacking the financial sector. The causes and effects are described in 
an analytical manner, showing causal effects from rising volumes of transactions, an 
inclination towards short-term and high risk operations and the development of high-
frequency trade towards a ‘highly volatile sector with a predisposition to regular crises’ 
(2012b Antonescu). Even high-frequency trading is opened up in its concrete meaning in the 
addresses (2012b EPP Silvestris). The justifications for increasing transparency on the 
financial markets or decreasing systemic risk are added to the familiar claims of curbing 
speculation, encouraging long-term investments and fairness (2012a Pietikäinen). Some of 
the internal EPP opponents of the FTT even voice their concerns over the effectiveness of the 
tax and in defence of the financial sector; from intending to curb speculation to punishing 
collective savings and condemning the European financial industry for the rejoicement of the 
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third countries (2012a Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou, Lulling). However, not all EPP MEPs are as 
cautious in their wording against the financial sector. One Member talks directly of ‘slowing 
down’ the market and returning it to its service function (2012a Langen). Other colleagues 
state that emerging new scandals mean that the sector has not learnt ‘anything’ and would 
still like to continue ‘business as usual’ – profiting from good times and leaving the losses to 
the taxpayers (2012a Ferber, Stolojan). One of the strongest wordings comes from a Southern 
MEP describing the financial crisis as ‘the devastating effects of raider activity’ (2012b 
Ciriaco De Mita). 
 
4.3.5 The European Union 
4.3.5.1 Harmonisation and federalisation 
The role of the European Union is anticipatedly one of the dividing factors in the discussions. 
As the theoretical literature on politicisation shows, the potential for contestation in the 
authoritarian frame of national vs. supranational power is evident. Deepening integration is 
an easy target to highlight for the Eurosceptic Members, whereas the federalist traits are 
likely to stay in the sidelines by the proponents of the tax in especially the larger groups with 
internal division.  
Taxation’s role and importance in the political tool kit is visible both in the speeches of the 
defenders’ of the Union as well as national sovereignty. Harmonisation and increasing Union 
powers receives support especially from the leftist S&D MEPs. Suggestions vary from 
reaching at least a common minimum transaction taxation level on the markets (2012b 
Blinkevičiūtė) to even calling for the derivatives to be taxed in line with the other products to 
truly combat speculation (2012a S&D Hoang Ngoc, 2012b GUE/NGL Zuber). One of the 
clearest federalist undertones can be found in one of the Member’s phrasing of the FTT as ‘an 
important contribution to strengthening the financial and budgetary integration of the EU’ 
(2012b S&D Moreira). It is clear in the debate that the question of advancing supranational 
influence is easier to voice out for the leftist MEPs – both for ideological and cultural reasons 
addressed in the theoretical framework. 
However, the difficulty in balancing between the national and supranational levels is clear in 
the issue of own resources even for the proponents of the FTT. One ALDE representative 
(2012a Jensen) brings forward the Budgetary Committee opinion that the FTT presents a 
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positive possibility for gathering needed Union resources and clarifying the current complex 
system of national contributions, though emphasising that the effects are only possible with a 
wide geographical implementation unfortunately impossible to foresee. Although one 
GUE/NGL MEP (2012b Ferreira) sees the reciprocal reducing in Member State contributions 
as ‘unacceptable’ due to relieving the richer countries with bigger markets and resulting in 
continued budgetary penury for the poorer ones; the gathering of own revenue is portrayed as 
a way for the Member States to reduce their contributions to the Union budget as they are 
already asked to reduce their deficits – even as a possibility to reduce national taxes (2012a 
NI Stadler, 2012a S&D Hoang Ngoc, Correia de Campos, 2012b S&D Flašíková Beňová). 
National undertones are visible even when voting for the FTT: though many Swedish MEPs 
voted for the proposal they clearly state to be against moving the authority to levy taxes to the 
EU-level (2012b S&D Färm, Hedh, Ludvigsson, Nilsson, Ulvskog &Westlund). 
The right-wing representatives especially in the smaller groups are predictably strongly 
against the harmonisation and transferral of taxation powers unto the Union level. The 
increase in the Commission’s powers with the possibility to adopt delegated acts as well as 
the allocation of the revenue into Union budget influenced some to abstention on the vote 
(2012b NI Gollnisch). The MEPs contest the Commission’s arguments for the necessity of 
tax harmonisation in the Union due to ‘distorted competition’ and arising more out of 
historical development (2012a EFD Andreasen). Many MEPs, some even from the left, claim 
that a tax on financial transaction should be operated not through the EU but by the Member 
States and they should also be the recipient of the funds (2012b EFD de Villiers, 2012b EPP 
Melo, 2012b GUE/NGL de Jong, 2012b NI Mölzer).  
The Eurosceptic MEPs are anticipatedly vehement in their criticism for the ‘federalist 
undertone’ of the proposal. The independence from the Member States via taxing rights and 
own resources is contested of going under the radar of democratically elected representatives 
or even the Council, as the EU is to be granted tax-raising powers without ‘democratic 
scrutiny’ (2012a EFD Andreasen, 2012b EFD de Villiers). The proposal is even portrayed as 
‘paving the way for a federalised super-state’ (2012b EFD de Villiers). Bypassing Member 
States with a supranational budget is pictured as ‘a long-term error with possibly fatal 
consequences for the democratic process’ (2012b EFD de Villiers). Some even claim that the 
only purpose of the FTT is to introduce an own source of revenue for the Union, while 
impeding on national sovereignty (2012b EFD Bufton). The Union’s own resources can be 
seen as a raid on national citizens where ‘ordinary people’ must bear the cost of the tax 
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(2012a NI Dodds, 2012b EFD Belder) as the Union is about to ‘finance itself directly from 
taxpayer’s pockets’ (2012a EFD Andreasen). Despite the strong criticism, no clear debate 
rises out of the topic as a majority of the MEPs steer clear from the theme. 
4.3.5.2 The use of the funds 
In addition to the sovereignty/harmonisation debate, the question on how the actual revenue 
would be allocated is a salient issue in the debate. The possible yearly revenue from the FTT 
is estimated from 50 to 60 billion euros, commonly around 57 billion (e.g. 2012a NI Martin, 
2012b S&D Creţu), but some even claim it to rise to a 100 billion (2012b S&D Paleckis). 
Although many MEPs especially on the left see the revenue as desired to speed up the 
recovery from the financial crisis, the division and usage of the revenue gathered with the 
FTT are not simple matters to answer. S&D MEPs refer to the revenue to be directed into a 
‘number of areas’, including the EU budget, to boost investments in growth and employment 
(2012a Guerrero Salom, 2012b Balčytis, Blinkevičiūtė, Zemke). One MEP even makes the 
point of saying that the raised revenue must also be sufficient for the Union to ‘fulfil its role 
as a political tool’ to overcome the crisis (2012b Blinkevičiūtė), again reflecting 
supranational tendencies.  
Whereas many Greens/EFA (e.g. 2012a Durant, 2012b Grèze), S&D (2012b Costello) and 
even some ALDE MEPs (2012b Michel & Ries, Oviir) support directing the revenue from 
the tax for own resources of the Union to be implemented into recovery projects, stimulus 
policies, development aid and tackling climate change befitting group ideology; the 
GUE/NGL MEPs want the revenue to be used in similar targets; into aid, environmental 
measures and social projects in developing countries, but bypassing the EU budget and 
directly from the Member States as taxation is a national competence (GUE/NGL 2012b 
Gustafsson, Hadjigeorgiou, Liotard, Søndergaard, Zuber). This is the most visible form of the 
groups’ anti-integrationist stance in the debate. Even though the initiative was seen as a leftist 
proposal, many GUE/NGL MEPs (2012b Meyer, Triantaphyllides) abstained due to the ‘far 
cry’ nature of the FTT from the original Tobin tax: the allocation of the revenue, the non-
removal of tax havens and the non-global nature of the tax.  
The positions on the right are more dispersed. As the previous chapter shows, some MEPs 
reject the notions of EU resources altogether, for example the ECR is adamantly against the 
FTT also because they believe in reducing the EU budget - not looking for new sources of 
revenue (2012a Strejček). Even though the stances might be wary at best, very few 
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representatives dismiss the entire issue of own resources altogether. Individual Members 
bring forward propositions of using the revenue for similar targets as the more leftist 
colleagues: in development aid, fighting climate change and cohesion policy (2012b EFD 
Imbrasas, Ziobro, 2012b EPP Striffler). It is seen as important that the gathered funds would 
not just fill Union coffers but were made to benefit those ‘unjustly suffering from the crisis’ 
(2012a NI Martin). The EPP is noticeably vague on the question of own resources. Whereas 
some boldly protect the idea of own resources and utilising the FTT for the Union to function 
more freely and ‘kick starting’ European growth (2012a Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou, 2012b 
Cancian, Sartori), many are quiet on the issue or refer ambiguously to shaping European 
budgets or Commission allocation plans to deal a third of the funds to the Member States 
(2012b La Via, Silvestris).  
 
4.3.6 Champions of the proposal and national interests 
4.3.6.1 Claiming credibility 
One interesting feature of the speeches is that after the proponents of the FTT have presented 
their opinion on the matter, it is equally important to draw credibility from previous acts of 
support for the initiative. Presenting oneself, the political group or Member State as a pioneer 
on the issue strengthens the arguments of the representatives and these arguments can be 
found in almost all of the groups (e.g. 2012a GUE/NGL Matias, 2012a NI Martin, 2012a 
S&D Cortés Lastra, Hoang Ngoc, 2012b ALDE Bilbao Barandica, 2012b EPP Auconie, 
2012b GUE/NGL Mélenchon). Claiming legitimacy is apparent on both sides of the debate. 
Expert support is drawn from e.g. the OECD, the Commission or financial experts and 
economists (2012a ECR Strejček, 2012a EFD Paška, 2012a Greens/EFA, Giegold, 2012a NI 
Martin,). The Parliament’s role as a forerunner of democracy against the Council is 
prominent in the discussions. The S&D rapporteur (2012a Podimata) makes the Parliament’s 
long-standing work on the issue clear right at the start of the debate. However, the 
Parliament’s role simply as a consultant is visible in the numerous pleas to the Council to 
listen and adhere to the opinion of the MEPs (Greens/EFA 2012a Turunen, GUE/NGL 2012a 
Klute, 2012b EPP Mazzoni). 
In general, the MEPs make very few direct remarks about other political groups or MEPs 
except when it comes to the largest group, the EPP, which is blamed for wanting to reduce 
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the scope of the tax (2012a Greens/EFA Giegold, 2012a S&D Hoang Ngoc, 2012b S&D 
Castex). The GUE/NGL also portrays the EU leaders, meaning the mainstream groups, as 
‘subservient’ to the financial markets (2012a Matias). However, the case is very different 
with references to the Member States. The positive outcome of the vote is often presented as 
a signal to the Member States to impose the tax and opponents’ positions are portrayed as 
regrettable (2012a ALDE Klinz, 2012b ALDE Griesbeck). Some of the proponents accuse 
the opposing Member States of having ‘very little interest’ in tackling issues such a financial 
transactions or tax fraud at a European level; even being guilty of depriving ‘us’ billions of 
euros every year from stimulating the economy (2012b ALDE Bilbao Barandica). The 
opponents, often especially the British, are described as holding the rest of the countries 
‘hostage’ and spreading propaganda (2012a NI Martin, 2012a S&D Podimata, 2012b S&D 
Paleckis). The EPP representatives are yet again more moderate in their wording with regards 
to the City of London, invoking it to come ‘on board’ as it holds two thirds of EU financial 
market transactions (2012a Langen) or pleading to the ‘understanding’ of ‘our British friends’ 
that the FTT could also be of benefit to them (2012b Vlasto). 
4.3.6.2 Defenders of sovereignty 
National interests are often drawn into the debate by the opponents of the FTT. The national 
position and possible damages are a fundamental justification over ideological reasons for the 
opposing MEPs under the authoritarian frame. Only the case of Ireland is brought into the 
discussion in a conflicting manner from the general tenets, understandable due to the strong 
opposition from Great Britain. The Irish Fine Gael delegation within the EPP abstained due 
to the possible disadvantages caused to the national economy due to the limited area of 
implementation, supporting a G20 wide FTT (2012b Kelly, Mitchell). However, one Irish 
S&D MEP (2012b Childers) claims that there are no independent sources to verify the 
negative effects of the FTT to Ireland, instead an estimated saving of 500 million euros is 
calculated by 2020 for the country. It is important for her to claim that Ireland will benefit 
from the FTT, whatever the UK decides (ibid.). 
The British are especially adamant, even vehement, in their support to the national stance 
against the FTT. The City of London is already pictured as contributing to the prosperity of 
the Union and the FTT would cause it global disadvantage, impacting up to 50.000 jobs 
(2012b ECR McClarkin, Tannock, Yannakoudakis). The British MEPs make a point that the 
British taxpayers will end up paying for the FTT even if it would veto the bill in the Council 
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(2012a EFD Andreasen). Some of the British MEPs even portray Brussels, referring to the 
European Union, and France and Germany, the major proponents of the tax, as ‘attacking’ the 
United Kingdom through descriptions such as delighting from the ‘unforetold damage’ to the 
City of London, ‘willing to see jobs and businesses driven out’ or simply by stating that 
‘when it comes to financial services, other EU countries are Mickey Mouse’ (2012a EFD 
Bloom, 2012b ECR Yannakoudakis, 2012b EFD Bufton). However, the opposition was also 
refuted with stating that two thirds of the British people support a nationally titled ‘Robin 
Hood tax’ because the financial sector is ‘largely undertaxed’, enjoying a 18 billion euro 
VAT exemption annually (2012a S&D McCarthy). The British Labour delegation within the 
S&D largely abstentioned on the vote. Even though they supported the principle of a ‘fair 
tax’ on financial transactions, the delegation saw it unacceptable that the revenue would be 
directed into the EU funds (2012b S&D McCarthy, Vaughan, Willmott). Whereas similar 
reasons made the ALDE group vote against the proposal, the individual delegation in a pro-
FTT group decided to vote blank. 
The British are not the only opponents to the FTT and their MEPs are quick to show that the 
Czech Republic, Cyprus and Malta also oppose the FTT and Italy, Ireland and Luxemburg 
are for the tax only if it is EU-wide as a solution (2012a ECR Fox, 2012b ECR 
Yannakoudakis). The Swedish example from the time of less mobile and global financial 
markets in the 1980s is also brought into the discussion as an example of the results from 
implementing the FTT in the EU (2012a ALDE Schmidt, 2012a EPP Hölmark, 2012b ECR 
McClarkin, 2012b EPP Svensson), although the worry was answered by correcting the 
residence principle with the issuing principle to prevent reallocation with the FTT (2012a 
S&D McCarthy). The Maltese MEPs portray the tax as against the interests of the country 
very similarly to the British, as the financial sector provides jobs for approximately 6000 
people and represents 15 % of the GDP (2012b S&D Cuschieri). Due to the lack of 
competitiveness imposed by the FTT, the trade is seen to reallocate outside Malta, thus 
harming the economy, the ‘ordinary bank users’ and ‘pensioners’ (ibid., 2012b S&D Grech, 
Scicluna). The Dutch are very divided on the FTT and the opponents show figures from 
national economic experts of the costs to the national citizens as a justification to avoid the 
tax, adding to the already introduced austerity measures (2012b EFD Belder). One of the 
strongest speeches promoting national interests against the proposal comes from a Dutch non-
attached Member (2012a Madlener). In a heightened address to the plenary the Parliament is 
presented as a ‘sham’, the FTT as a ‘scam’ and the Netherlands as ‘sick and tired’ of the 
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‘money-eating’ Union. The strong rhetoric for national sovereignty and the Dutch people as 
liable for other Member States’ debts is very different from the mainstream parties’ MEPs 
speeches, but most likely very much in the MEP’s constituents liking.  
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4.4 REFLECTIONS FROM THE PLENARY DEBATE 
 
The key issues and themes arising from the plenary debates are divided under the three levels 
presented already in the theoretical framework: the juxtaposition between supranational 
political group and national political system pressures, the impact of political ideology and 
the groups as well as strategic individual utility-maximising through politicisation and issue 
entrepreneurship. The three politicisation frames arising from the discourse - normative, 
functional and authoritarian - somewhat overlap these three levels of influence; especially in 
the authoritarian frame of the fight for power between the national and supra-national levels 
of decision-making. The frames are revised in the third chapter 4.4.3 on political actors and 
politicisation. 
 
4.4.1 National vs. supranational 
The interplay between political group and national pressures is most visible in the speeches of 
the staunch defenders of national opposition to the FTT proposal and especially the 
Eurosceptics. The ECR group, for which the opposition to the FTT seems ideologically 
natural, ‘fundamentally reject’ the proposal (2012a ECR Strejček). Opposition to the proposal 
is also noticeably strong and present in the speeches when the financial sector has a major 
role in the national economy. The discourse of defending national jobs and economy is 
visible especially in the British and Maltese MEPs’ addresses.  
Euroscepticism is visible in the speeches, most prominently in the discourses from the 
opponents of the FTT, but also the leftist GUE/NGL Member’s scepticism towards 
integration is apparent in their rejection of the FTT revenue to be directed to the Union. The 
most Eurosceptic parties are thus located at the extreme ends of the political left-right 
continuum as predicted by theory. The voting statistics presented in chapter 4.1.2 and table 9 
show strong internal cohesion within the Member State delegations where the national stance 
is positive towards the proposal - this is also visible in the debate with almost uniform 
acceptance of the proposal. The MEPs from countries with a negative opinion on the question 
are far more diverse and these tendencies are also visible is the plenary debate. The 
theoretical background highlights that Eurosceptic mobilisation has been easiest in countries 
with already a sceptical attitude towards integration, often rising out of cultural features, and 
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especially the right-wing British MEPs are strong in their wording against the European 
Union. Whereas the background literature highlights that Eurosceptic factions arise both from 
the left and right and vary between Member States, in the question of the FTT the left is 
clearly more ideologically for the proposal even despite their cautions towards the increase in 
Union competencies and powers. 
Political groups are brought into the discussion mainly as a reinforcement to emphasise and 
claim credibility for the Member’s statements, noticeably when the MEPs speak for the FTT 
and highlight the long-term commitment of their group behind the initiative or in some 
scattered remarks refer to the opposition of the other groups. Otherwise the political groups 
themselves play no major influence in the discourse; instead their influence is very visible in 
the voting decisions, especially when the Member State has no strong position towards the 
proposal, as the analysis chapter 4.1.4 shows. Political ideology plays no overt role as a 
justification for the FTT in the MEPs’ speeches, in other words ideological justifications are 
not the main rationality presented for or against the tax; instead they seep into the discourse 
through concepts such as solidarity, democracy, sovereignty, markets and the examples of 
revenue usage analysed in more detail in the following chapter. 
What is interesting is measuring the difference between ideological and political group 
influence and, although the depth of this thesis might be inadequate to separate the influence 
of these two from each other, the question begs to propose some suggestions as to how they 
manifest themselves. It might be safe to say that the smaller groups, especially the 
Greens/EFA, ECR and GUE/NGL are ideologically quite coherent and thus the two factors 
reinforce each other. However, as the theoretical literature confirms, the largest political 
groups – EPP, S&D and ALDE – comprise of very different national delegations whose 
ideological emphases might be very different from each other, save perhaps the socialist S&D 
where ideology is presumably somewhat more uniform. The EPP has played a major role in 
promoting European integration and it still quite coherent on the issue, whereas ALDE is 
very internally divided on the question of the FTT. What simple voting statistics do not reveal 
is the fact that ALDE as a group opposed the proposal due to the fact that it would have 
hampered European unity. For these established large groups it is nonetheless likely that 
especially in the absence of a strong unifying political ideology, group influence matters 
most. This assumption can also be drawn from the fact that the centre-right EPP formed a 
coalition with the leftist groups to promote the proposal. The smaller EFD group consists of 
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very diverse national delegations and for their Members political ideology is prone to 
outweigh group pressures.  
 
4.4.2 Political identities   
The theoretical framework emphasises the ideological differences between political parties 
and groups in the European Parliament in the form of left-right and GAL-TAN divides as 
well as ideological attitudes towards the European integration. Some general political and 
ideological traits and features emerge from the discourses that can be presented as follows: 
for the centre-left S&D concepts and issues such as fairness, stability and using the FTT to 
invest in growth and jobs to tackle the financial crisis are recurrent themes. The centre-right 
EPP’s tone is far more moderate than most of the participants’ addresses. Economic 
arguments in almost all of their Members’ speeches emphasise the pro-market nature of the 
group. EPP’s representatives even bring out shades of grey into the conversation instead of 
uniform approval or rejection. What is noteworthy is that the dissident voices within the S&D 
and EPP are very vocal and often refer to either national damages, negative economic 
implications or both. The centrist ALDE offers the most puzzling case of all of the political 
groups as the group is varied both in votes and discourses – reflecting the diverse nature of 
the group. The economic arguments are used for and against the FTT and the common theme 
of reallocation and the role of the Union are repeated in the speeches. 
Unfortunately the Greens/EFA Members are prominently quiet in the debate so the summary 
is drawn from only a few addresses. However, the role of the citizens and emphasising 
democracy rises to the fore with defending specific elements of the planned FTT, instigated 
to prevent reallocation. Solidarity and the people are expectedly prominent in the leftist 
GUE/NGL speeches yet anti-integration and directing the funds into development and 
fighting climate change also arise as strong issues. The ECR is by far the most critical group 
towards the proposition with both economic and national arguments. As anticipated, the 
British as a large delegation within the group are especially active and vocal in defending 
their large financial sector and citizens’ interests. The EFD is only slightly less critical 
towards to the proposal with strong British and Dutch voices defending national sovereignty 
and citizens, and a few hesitant Members who doubt the actual effectiveness of the FTT. The 
non-attached Members offer predictably the most varied group of speeches from strong 
 83 
 
defenders to equally strong rejections. The financial sector is the main argument for and 
national interests against the proposal.  
Considering the framework of regulated capitalism vs. neoliberalism, the plenary debate does 
show ideological tenets from the left preferring regulation, control over markets and seeing 
the FTT as a solution to tackle the financial crisis; whereas the right argues more strongly 
with economic justifications that the proposed FTT is to cause harm on the markets and 
national economies and the FTT is at best a political solution, not an optimal economic 
remedy to the crisis. Moreover, where the main debate between the large centrist political 
groups is conducted via economic arguments, the more extreme political groups dispersed 
more on the GAL-TAN divide show clearer ideological tenets. For the Greens/EFA in the 
GAL end integration and promoting democracy over markets is an ideological question. The 
leftist GUE/NGL support solidarity and citizens’ interests over banks, but are still wary of 
integration. To the other TAN end, the right-wing ECR and EFD found their arguments on 
national sovereignty and anti-integration – just as the literature presumes them to do. The 
only outlier in this framework is the centre-liberal ALDE group, which is divided internally 
and thus also argumentatively – instilling it centre-field not only politically but also narrative-
wise between the S&D and EPP. 
 
4.4.3 Political actors and politicisation 
The political discourse from the plenary debates on the financial transaction tax have been 
analysed from the national vs. supranational and political group levels. The question of 
individual politicians and how politicisation emerges through the narratives remains to be 
considered. The theoretical framework emphasises politicians as rational utility-seeking 
politicians that have their ultimate goal in being re-elected. Thus they have to take into 
consideration the pressures between the national and electoral aspirations as well as the 
supranational level politics and group targets. Balancing between these institutional aspects 
offers politicians both restrictions as well as possibilities. The possibilities arising from 
framing salient issues to suit one’s goals is an important tool in pleading to the electorates via 
the plenary discourses. These two aspects are thus handled together concerning the 
discourses. 
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Background literature raises issues such as the MEP’s self-vision of Europeanness and 
strategic voting as influencing voting decisions. Although simple quantitative voting statistics 
cannot reveal the complex networks behind the voting decisions, some implications can be 
derived from the discourse. A self-vision of Europeanness is in honesty far harder to prove 
without an inquiry addressed to individual MEPs; instead a pronounced self-vision of 
nationalness is clear in the discourse. The benefits and especially disadvantages to the nation 
state are vocal elements in the narratives. A strong national identity is visible especially in the 
FTT opponents’ and anti-integrationists’ addresses in the plenary but also in the way how 
representatives originating in countries deeply impacted by the crisis strongly emphasise their 
national experiences. The voting statistics already analysed in the previous chapter 4.1.4 
feature a clear amount of abstentions and rebel voters against the group voting instructions. 
This is largely shown through the discourse to originate from Member State pressures and 
economic arguments. Ideological reasons are secondary to these two causes, or then they are 
combined with or hidden beneath them. It is also easier for MEPs to vote according to 
supranational group lines if the Member State does not have a strong opinion on the FTT. 
This type of strategic voting is also visible in the debate as emphasising political and 
economic arguments while downplaying the importance of the question at the national level. 
The roles assigned to the MEPs, be it a pro-European legislator, a nationalist partisan or a 
generally representative communitarian, are represented in the discourses. Partisans and 
legislators are easy to identify in the discourses especially in the smaller groups – whether 
vouching for national or European goals. The communitarians could be identified most firmly 
within the largest groups of especially ALDE and EPP with economic arguments and 
analysing comments on the FTT. 
Surely it is in the interest of every politician to politicise legislative proposals in a manner 
most appealing to their electorates. Politicisation is most efficient when politicians join 
together in groups to emphasise similar issues, hence the theories also often handle parties 
instead of individuals. The theoretical literature is drawn between the root determinants of 
politicisation: the big players or the small niche parties. A caption from the political debate 
on one issue during one day hardly counts as verifying or falsifying theories, yet a specific 
pattern emerges from the FTT debate. The large groups are quite unison in their speeches 
about the proposal, whereas the smaller groups bring variety of elements into the discussion. 
Naturally representatives from the larger groups bring individual issues to the debate as well, 
however, as a group they tend to make similar arguments and repeat each other’s statements.  
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The analysis of politicisation searches for signals such as priming (bringing forth issue 
salience), framing (connecting the consideration to a political target) and cueing (instilling 
bias) from the political debate (Hooghe & Marks 2009, 13). The priming of the FTT is clear 
in the active discussion around the theme and the way almost all of the political groups are 
active in the debate. The analysis reveals three different types of framing the question of the 
Financial Transaction Tax. Against the backdrop of the financial crisis, a normative frame of 
the guilty banks against the victimised citizens clearly emerges in all of the political groups. 
A functional frame arises in the form of ‘rational’ economic justifications for and against the 
proposal. Economic arguments are used both by the proponents and opponents of the FTT, 
even the very same arguments of tackling the crisis or of efficient markets; especially the 
centre-right EPP’s representatives are often noticeably neutral in their arguments and 
founding on economic rationality. The high amounts of economic justifications support 
theories of normalisation. The European Union and the FTT are issues just as everything else; 
answering to the question “what kind of Europe?”. Finally, an authoritarian frame can be 
drawn from the competition for power between national and European-level decision-
making. Ideological influence seeps through the narratives in all of these frames, influencing 
the cueing part – or instilling bias – in the speeches. These three frames of normative, 
functional and authoritarian narratives are easily connected to larger political discourses 
around economic regulation and the development of the European Union. The FTT is brought 
forward as a vital question, then framed to connect the proposal with a larger political debate 
and finally portrayed in a way suitable to the MEP’s ideological background and electorate. 
Legitimating ideas from all sides of the political spectrum are used to appeal to the MEPs’ 
own support base and there does not seem to be a difference whether the speeches are 
delivered live or afterwards in a written form. 
Theory raises the question of consocialism as taming politicisation through multiple veto 
points, cooperative mechanisms and behaviour – by instilling a universal code of conduct. 
Even though a majority of the MEP speeches follow a certain rhythm and formula of a 
plenary discourse, much like March and Olsen’s logic of appropriateness, some MEPs break 
the line in their addresses (2012a EFD Bloom, 2012a NI Madlener). Even though the 
emphasis is on the collective politicisation, individual politicians – especially in the extreme 
ends of the political spectrum – often have little to lose in breaking from the general line, 
turning the heat in the debate up and trying to use heavy rhetoric to influence the debate. 
Irony, metaphor, contestation, pointing fingers, ridicule and naming are mediums used in the 
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discourse to emphasise one’s own political message. Rhetorical devices are rife in the 
outskirts of the debate. 
Summing up, politicisation is anticipatedly strongest with parties that have European 
integration as an integral part of their ideology and they use it to their strategic advantage to 
appeal to their voters. At first it would support theories of small parties owning the issue 
framing and thus politicisation of the salient issues. The representatives from EPP, S&D and 
ALDE – when approving the FTT – are usually quiet about the possible negative national 
elements of the proposed tax, which in turn are strongly visible in the opponents’ narratives. 
However, one must also take into consideration decades of tradition in building a European 
Union within the larger political groups. Despite possible internal division on the issue, the 
mainstream groups’ argumentation is firmly founded on economic arguments and more in-
depth analysis of a simple ‘for or against’.  
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5 CONCLUSION  
The thesis set out to discover two things: how is the financial transaction tax presented by the 
Members of the European Parliament and how do the background factors of the political 
group, ideology and national opinion on the financial transaction tax affect the voting 
decisions and issue framing? The merits of the research lie especially in showing the variety 
in the narratives depending on the representative’s national and ideological background as 
well as attesting the importance of national influence in supranational decision-making. 
The issue of the financial transaction tax proves to be a controversial topic – there is no single 
overarching consensus on the meaning and effectiveness of the FTT. The discourses can be 
divided under three frames of politicisation, connecting the debates into wider political 
narratives and targets. First, the normative frame is set against the backdrop of the financial 
crisis. The financial sector is seen as the source of the current plight of the citizens and almost 
all representatives regardless of political ideology portray the banks as the guilty party that 
needs to suffer as the people have. To some MEPs the FTT is the solution in tackling the 
crisis, to others it would only make it worse. Second, a functional frame of ‘neutral’ 
economic arguments for or against the proposal emerges in the tax. Here, innuendos of 
political identities seep through the addresses in the way how pro-market right-wing groups 
make noticeably economic arguments or how leftist MEPs emphasise the usage of the 
gathered funds into development aid or fighting climate change. Finally, an authoritarian 
frame arises from the power struggle between the Member State and supranational EU levels. 
The FTT can be depicted as a method of improving European unity or attacking national 
sovereignty. In the end, the proposal of adding a tax on the financial markets is politicised 
into anything the MEPs see politically most useful for their own agenda.  
The politicians form their actions in the crossfire of national and supranational pressures. For 
some MEPs this proves to be a secondary issue as national stances support the opinions of the 
political group, thus they are freer in their actions be they British opponents or French 
supporters of the FTT. However, to some the juxtaposition is not a trivial matter cast off with 
a shrug. The opinions from the national governments often influence the Members to vote 
against their group line or at least abstain from the vote. Another issue altogether is when the 
Member State does not have a strong stance on the FTT, the MEPs by and large follow group 
instructions. No clear definition of ‘ Europeanness’ is brought forward in the speeches of the 
MEPs, instead a clear image of ‘nationalness’ in strongly visible in the narratives of the 
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opponents to the FTT especially in the smaller right-wing political groups. Moreover, a 
distinct sense of nationality arises from the MEP’s originating in the Southern Member 
States, most affected by the financial crisis. 
The effects of ideology on the political groups and politicians are visible in the plenary 
debate. Table three presented earlier in this thesis presents possible influential ideological 
tenets on the FTT according to the political groups. The elements of anti-market ideology are 
strong in the left’s speeches of regulating the financial markets whereas the more right-wing 
EPP, ALDE and ECR show more concern for the proper functioning of the markets after a 
possible tax is introduced. These results support the theoretical framework derived from 
Hooghe and Marks’ studies (2009) on regulated capitalism vs. neoliberalism, where the left 
favours increasing economic regulation over the more sceptical right-wing politicians. The 
narratives from the smaller political groups are based more on the researchers’ GAL 
(green/alternative/libertarian) – TAN (traditional/authoritarian/nationalist) divide (Hooghe et 
al. 2004; Hooghe & Marks 2009), where ideology shapes the discussion more than economic 
arguments. Anti-integration and nationalism are fundamental features of the narratives 
originating from the extreme ends of the political divide, whereas the mainstream parties in 
the middle are more concerned about ‘what kind of Europe’ is churned out of the European 
institutions.  
All of these aspects are expected based on the theoretical framework, but the results also offer 
an interesting example of empirical evidence breaking the line from theoretical expectations. 
A clear diverging case is the behaviour of the representatives of the centrist group ALDE. 
The group ended up opposing the FTT but for totally diverging reasons than could be 
expected through the theoretical literature: instead of opposing European integration and 
harmonisation, ALDE saw the FTT as hindering European unity with its fragmented 
implementation. Another interesting issue is Euroscepticism, which does not seem to play a 
part in guiding anyone’s decisions and narratives but their own. This is at contrast to 
assumptions rising from theoretical literature, but it might also be due to the analysis being 
founded on a single plenary session debate and a single policy proposal. The effects of the 
Eurosceptic parties are most likely more visible in large shifts over longer periods of time, 
not in a single issue handling in one arena. In a strongly pro-integrationist environment and 
institutions one might even speculate that the Eurosceptics are ostracised in the Parliament 
into the sidelines.  
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An interesting question emerges from the study on the Financial Transaction Tax, namely are 
the theories from mainly before the financial crisis still usable in describing the current 
turbulent political climate? The dominating theories have a strong emphasis on right-wing 
Euroscepticism and nationalist extremism against European integration. However, it is the 
left wing parties that are currently voicing the disaccord against European crisis measures in 
Southern European Member States such as Greece and Spain – and gaining increasing 
popularity with their anti-EU rhetoric – while the right-wing nationalist parties and groups 
remain with limited success. These tenets are evident already in the discourse on the FTT. 
The plight of the common man is at the forefront of the leftist rhetoric combined with distrust 
over increasing European influence and market control. While the extreme right is pushed to 
the sidelines in the political debate and largely ignored by the larger groups, the leftist group 
forms a part of the coalition to push the initiative forward. Both the left and right are more or 
less against deepening European integration and taking power away from nation states – and 
even for the same reasons: the citizens – but the leftist rhetoric of solidarity and democracy is 
more easily digested than the xenophobic or openly hostile right-wing narratives. 
It is also clear that the interplay and tensions between supranational and national levels of 
decision-making are still as viable as ever. Member State opinion weighs in politically salient 
questions as representatives wish to secure their re-election. Supranational political groups 
are most influential when the Member States have no strong opinion. For further purposes, it 
could be useful to develop and refine a more in-depth theoretical framework for describing 
the multi-layered decision-making processes within the European institutions. Many of the 
current theories available for political analysts are strongly tied to their time of creation, the 
political atmosphere or a single institutional venue. Although it guarantees that new research 
is constantly needed, more general approaches could prove more effective in describing and 
especially predicting influential factors and outcomes of complex political processes. 
Combining elements from rational choice and sociological institutionalism worked well for 
the analysis of ideological as well as concrete incentives and restraints. Expanding this 
foundation to include different institutions and the national influence could be useful for 
future research. 
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